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EXTRATERRITORIALITY, ANTITRUST, AND THE
PRAGMATIST STYLE'
Justin Desautels-Stein*
ABSTRACT
In the last decades of the 20th century, David Kennedy and Martti
Koskenniemi made the case that the modern structure of international legal
argument was characterized by "pragmatism." Taking this idea as its
baseline, this Article's central argument is that legal pragmatism embodies a
dominant style of contemporary legal reasoning, and that as Kennedy and
Koskenniemi might have suggested, it is on display in some of the canonical
antitrust decisions having an international dimension. The Article also seeks
to show that pragmatism's ostensible triumph is best understood as a contest
of three distinctly legal pragmatisms: "eclectic pragmatism," as evidenced in
the work of Thomas Grey and Daniel Farber, "economic pragmatism," as
espoused by Richard Posner, and "experimental pragmatism," represented in
the work of Charles Sabel, William Simon, and Michael Dorf While these
three styles are hardly determinative, they do suggest meaningfully different
orientations, as illustrated in an analysis of F. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran, the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent extraterritorial antitrust
decision. The irony, once one sees the three pragmatisms in action, is that they
all fail to offer anything resembling the promise of a truly pragmatist moment
of legal decision.
t This Article builds on a prior publication, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565 (2007). Small segments of that article have been
reproduced here.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado: LL.M., Harvard Law School (2006); J.D., UNC-
Chapel Hill School of Law (2005); M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School, Tufts University (2004). Many thanks in
particular to David Kennedy for his guidance on this project. I have also received helpful comments from
Jonathan Baker, Paulo Daflon Barrozo, Adrienne Davis, Fernanda Nicola, William Partlett, Hengameh Saberi,
and participants in faculty presentations from the University of Florida College of Law, the University of
Oregon Law School, and the University of Colorado Law School.
DtiESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
500 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
IN TRO D U CTIO N .............................................................................................. 50 1
I. ECLECTIC PRAGMATISM: A DOMINANT STYLE OF LEGAL
R EA SO N IN G ? .................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
A. Pragmatism in Context: From the Vernacular to the
P hilosop hical .............................................................................. 509
B. Legal Pragmatism and the Eclectic Style ................................... 511
II. THE LAW OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ............................... 514
A. Pragmatism in International Law .............................................. 514
B. Sovereigny/Jurisdiction and Internal/External Rules ................ 516
C. The Rules of Jurisdiction ............................................................ 518
1. C om ity .................................................................................. 5 18
2. The Effects Test and the Rule of Reasonableness ................. 522
Il1. EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST AND THE PRAGMATIST STYLE ........ 525
A. From Alcoa to Empagran ........................................................... 526
1. Alcoa and the Effects Test .................................................... 526
2. The Consequentialism of Timberlane ................................... 527
3. The Apolitical Attitude in Hartford Fire ............................... 529
4. Empagran and the Eclectic Style .......................................... 530
IV. PRAGMATISM FIGHTS BACK: WHAT ECONOMICS AND
EXPERIMENTALISM MIGHT OFFER EXTRATERRITORIAL
A N TITR U ST ......................................................................................... 537
A. An Economic Pragmatist View ................................................... 538
1. P olicy A nalysis ..................................................................... 545
2. R easonableness .................................................................... 548
3. The Turn to Economic Analysis ............................................ 548
4. C onclusion ............................................................................ 550
B. An Experimental Pragmatist View ............................................. 551
1. Globalization, Deliberation, Experimentalism ..................... 558
2. C om ity R ecast ....................................................................... 560
3. Deliberation and Information Pooling ................................. 562
4. Rolling-Rule Regim es ........................................................... 563
C O N CLU SIO N .................................................................................................. 564
DLESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
2008] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & ANTITRUST 501
INTRODUCTION
In law school and law practice, a standard method for approaching legal
questions begins with the identification of a central set of issues and its
governing rules and standards.1  Although this step of choosing the
authoritative rule will itself require a degree of strategic thinking, 2 only then
does the standard call for an analysis of the nexus between the issue and the
rule, and finally an estimation of the appropriate conclusion. If the legal
reasoner happens to be in law school, she will likely characterize her
conclusion in an exam or essay as being the "right" one-an answer that has
balanced the countervailing arguments and concluded that one course of action
is somehow superior to the other. In the context of practice, a lawyer will be
less concerned with the supposed right answer, and more interested in the
conclusion that has marshaled the very best non-frivolous arguments in support
of her client. By way of example, take the Supreme Court's extraterritorial
antitrust decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.3 If called
upon to provide a short summary to a professor or partner, the student or
associate would identify the "issue" as whether foreign nationals, seeking
redress for injuries caused by foreign defendants, on foreign soil, could apply
U.S. antitrust law to their claims in U.S. court.4 The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA) provided the "rule." 5  The Court's "analysis"
phase consisted of a brief but unconvincing look at the statute's language and
legislative history and a more substantial consideration of how the exercise of
U.S. jurisdiction over those foreign actors might adversely affect the
international legal order. 6 The "conclusion," or the holding of the case, was
that the plaintiffs would lack standing if it could be proved that their injuries
were independent of any anticompetitive effects in the United States.7
This explanation, however vague and imprecise, describes a working
theory of contemporary legal reasoning. Regardless of whether the point is to
1 Although the names may differ, the "IRAC" method-issue, rule, analysis, conclusion-seems the
standard form for first year legal writing courses. A typical example is CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL
METHOD AN) WRITING 69 95 (2006).
2 The fact that the third phase is called "analysis" implies that the choosing of the relevant rule is taken
as a given. Quite clearly, much of the fight is over which rule in fact applies to a particular legal question.
3 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
4 See generallA id.
5 See id. at 164-67 (applying the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)-(2)
(2006)).
6 Id. at 161 70.
7 Id. at 175. For further discussion of the case, see iqf/a notes 172-209 and accompanying text.
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identify the "right" answer on an exam or the "best" result for a client, when
we hear talk of what it means to "think like a lawyer," this is it.
Sort of. Predictably, this description fails to identify at least one critical
step in the process of legal reasoning, either as performed by the jurist or the
court. Once the reasoner has found her issues and rules, but before she moves
on to the analysis, what decision has she made with respect to the style of her
analysis in reaching her conclusion? 8 When she attempts to connect the issues
and the rules, in what manner will she develop the analysis? Which technique
will she choose to drive the course of her reasoning? In many classrooms and
law offices, these questions will be met with a single response: the sound of
crickets. Although law journals continue to offer examinations of the ways,
both old and new, that jurists reason their way through legal problems, training
in the craft appears to largely ignore them.
For generations, however, the questions of what it meant to think like a
lawyer, and what it meant to apply the tools of legal reasoning, were quite
clear.9 Nineteenth century lawyers, for example, utilized what is known today
as Classical Legal Thought (CLT).' 0  Also known as "formalism,"'' the
classical style of legal reasoning began with a series of premises regarding the
clear separation of public and private authority, the sanctity of individual
8 It is easy to confuse a number of phrases that all have to do with the ways in which we think about the
law. "Philosophy of law" conventionally explores meta-questions that go to whether and how laws exist, and
what elements are necessary for this construction. Classic examples include: H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (2d ed. 1997): HANS KEIiSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967). Similarly, theories of law often implicate
the normative structure of legal systems and provide explanations for the political or moral nature of the law.
With respect to legal style, this Article adopts the view of David Kennedy and William Fisher. See
DAVIi KENNEIDY & WII11AM W. FISHER 111, THE CANON OF AMIERICAN LEGAl THOUGHT 1- 16 (2006). When
we focus on the style (or method or mode) of legal reasoning, we are not concerned with philosophical
questions regarding the nature of law, but rather with the more practice-oriented techniques that lawyers use to
help them reason from a premise to an argument to a conclusion.
9 KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 8, at 1-3.
10 See generally DUNCAN KENNEIDY, THE RISE ANI) FALILOF CILASSICAl LEGA, THOUGHT (2006).
In Richard Posner's words:
[Formalists] decide cases by applying preexisting rules or... by employing allegedly distinctive
modes of legal reasoning, such as "legal reasoning by analogy." They do not legislate, do not
exercise discretion other than in ministerial matters (such as scheduling), have no truck with
policy, and do not look outside conventional legal texts mainly statutes, constitutional
provisions, and precedents (authoritative judicial decisions)-for guidance in deciding new cases.
For [formalists], the law is an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique.
RICHARI A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 7-8 (2008).
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autonomy, and the formal power of deductive logic. 12 Legal reasoning in the
classical period typically entailed identifying a relevant concept, such as
"freedom of contract," and deducing a conclusion based on the apparent
boundaries of that right.' ' The style was crisp, guided by its unwavering
confidence in natural and absolute divisions of power. In the early decades of
the twentieth century, writers under the banner of Legal Realism attacked the
black and white attitude of the classical style. 14 For these scholars, CLT was a
style of legal reasoning shot through with contradictions and indeterminacies:
an approach to legal decision-making that began with the articulation of formal
principles from which practitioners could deduce legal conclusions was
inevitably arbitrary.' 5 Perhaps even more importantly, the classical style failed
to capture what was most essential for any type of legal analysis appropriately
attuned to its social milieu-explicit considerations of policy consequences.'
6
12 See, e.g., Christopher Columbus Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 659
(1900). For a discussion of CLT, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globali-ations qf Law and Legal Thought:
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
13 In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court illustrated the classical style of legal
reasoning. In his dissent, Justice Holmes refuted the majority's deductive method which had rejected a New
York statute limiting the number of hours a baker could work in a week, arguing that the "Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MINi' 42-48 (1930); Morris R. Cohen, The Process of
Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REV. 161 (1914); Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Noncoercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied Judicial Reasoning, 23 YAILE L.J. 16 (1913): Karl N. Llewelleyn, A Realistic Jurisprudenc-The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); see also AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William Fisher et al. eds., 1993);
MORTON J. HOWIlTZ, THE TRANSIFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 169-213 (1992): Thomas C. Grey, Holmes
and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV.
465 (1988).
15 See Hohfeld, supra note 14, at 28-29. For Hohfeld, the capricious character of classical legal
reasoning stenmed from the
assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to "rights" and "duties," and that these latter
categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal
interests .... Even if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of terminology,
its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite recognition and persistent effort toward
improvement: for in any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued
words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression.
Id.
16 Robert Hale explained that it was an error to perceive classic liberal market theory as apolitical, and
that attention to the political commitments immanent in the private law was essential:
[A] careful scrutiny will, it is thought, reveal a fallacy in [the apolitical view], and will
demonstrate that the systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality
permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom, and with restrictions, moreover, out
of conformity with any formula of "equal opportunity" or of "preserving the rights of others."
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Where the classical style rigidly separated law and politics, legal realists
smashed that divide.'
7
The deconstruction of the classical style was not just an Ivory Tower
affair. 18 As David Kennedy and William Fisher explain, "[b]y the 1950s, it
had become common sense that the legal materials did not generate unique
solutions to individual cases."'1 9  But despite the widespread acceptance of
CLT's faults and the customary ability to identify deductive errors and stale
recitations of the rhetoric of "tradition," Legal Realism failed to offer
practitioners a steady replacement for the received forms of legal analysis.
°
The resolution appeared in the 1950s and 1960s with the advent of the Legal
Process approach, generated by Henry Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks.2' This
approach not only instructed the legal reasoner to first understand that law is a
purposive policy instrument (as taught by the Realists), but also to focus on the
institutional and procedural aspects of the legal order. 22 Indeed, for the jurist
informed by Legal Process, her adventure in legal reasoning was primarily
guided by an eye for the competing jurisdictional realms occupied by the
courts, Congress, and administrative agencies. 23 As for the style of decision,
Legal Process scholars suggested that the aim was to produce a "reasoned
elaboration" that monitored the procedures constituting the multiple legal
orders, and appropriately balanced the principles and political considerations
24implicated in the issues. Although something like this may seem familiar to
the contemporary sensibility, the Legal Process style deteriorated in the 1970s
25
and 1980s on a number of fronts. Foremost among the new styles of legal
Hale, supra note 14, at 470.
17 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault., 15 LEGAl STD. F. 327 (1991).
18 KENNEDY&FISHER, supra note 8, at 10 11.
19 Id.
20 Singer, supra note 14, at 467-68: (' Kennedy, supra note 12, at 40 (listing four positive proposals that
the "social people," including legal realists, had for reconstructing the law).
21 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & AIEBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li-cxxxvi
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994): AiIEXANI)ER BICKEIL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
22 See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARIDOZO
L. REV. 601, 632-42, 653 70, 692 705 (1993).
23 Id. at 685-92.
24 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
ANT) APPICATION O- LAW 123 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994): Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 CoitM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
25 For critiques, see for example DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991): Paul Brest, The Substance qf Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981): Frank H.
DriESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
2008] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & ANTITRUST 505
reasoning were those taking their cues from economics,2 6 sociology,27 critical
28 29 3031theory, political philosophy, feminism, and racial theory. Unlike the
aftermath of the realist attack on CLT, in which Legal Process achieved
hegemonic stability, a new consensus failed to emerge in the late twentieth
32
century.
The re-telling of this well-known story begs a familiar question: Is there
now a dominant style of legal reasoning? One would think, probably not.
First, the mere fact that most law practitioners would regard this question with
ennui suggests that the answer is probably in the negative. Second, the
sectarian nature of the methodological landscape indicates a wide diversity of
views regarding the best style of legal reasoning instead of just one. Third,
there is substantial evidence that contemporary legal analysis is more than just
a hodge-podge of "law and" movements-relics of the classic style, Legal
Realism, and Legal Process continue to live on.33 Today's jurist apparently
faces a veritable smorgasbord of legal styles.
Despite these appearances, this Article wonders whether there is, in fact, a
dominant style of legal reasoning-a style known as Legal Pragmatism.
Consider again the style of reasoning summarized above. After identifying the
issue and the relevant rules and standards, the reasoner enters that apparently
style-free wasteland known as the analysis phase on her way toward a
conclusion. While the majority of what actually happens here is left to
personal discretion, at least three points remain constant. First, there is a
premium on the ability to rationally balance competing considerations.
Second, it is important to engage in some degree, however limited, of policy
analysis. 34  Third, and this is key, the "best" analysis will be the one that
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). See generally Thurman Arnold, Prqfessor
Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).
26 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View qfthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. Ri-V. 1089 (1972).
27 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminan Study, 28 Am.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
28 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV L. REV. 1685
(1976).
29 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
30 See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofJIdeology and Legal Ref rrn, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983).
31 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YAILE L.J. 470 (1976).
32 KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 8, at 8-12.
33 See ROBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 41 52 (1996).
34 Duncan Kennedy provides a description of policy analysis:
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achieves the "best" results. To be sure, this is not the only way in which to
craft a legal analysis, but admitting this lack of universality hardly denies its
prevalence. As it turns out, an approach to legal decision-making that trades
heavily on the power of "reasonableness," "balancing," and "what works," has
35
a name.
One might wonder, nevertheless, how the contemporary situation-littered
with remnants of the classical, realist, and process styles, along with the
interdisciplinary methodologies of the late twentieth century-is reconciled
with the suggestion that legal pragmatism might be the sign of the times. The
connection is subtle but ultimately simple. Legal Pragmatism is often
manifested in a fundamentally eclectic fashion, allowing the student,
practitioner, or judge to analyze a set of legal questions with whatever tools are
necessary "to get the job done." Indeed, "eclectic pragmatism" is a widely
practiced, widely unrecognized, shape-shifting, accommodating mode of legal
reasoning that manages to compile the debris of American legal thought into a
single, identifiable style. This style favors consequences, disfavors overt
political discussions, leans toward empirical analysis, shies away from a
formal connection with precedent, is wary of formal techniques of reasoning,
and largely relies on a rule of reason and the ability to balance conflicting
considerations.
36
The analysis presupposes that there are many policies, or desiderata, in rule making, that they
often though not always conflict, that they are well conceptualized as forces or weights or vectors
in a force field, and that they vary in force or weight according to the precise factual
circumstances to which they are applied within the field. Policies come in conflicting pairs of
different types, including conflicting welfare arguments, conflicting moral maxims, and
conflicting subjective rights. There are also as we will see an important class of "institutional"
policies.
Rational decision is defined in policy analysis as choosing a norm to apply to this case
and to a class of similar others in the future on the basis of a total-value-maximizing balance of the
conflicting policies.
Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber's Sociology in
the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1072 (2004);
see infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
35 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AN) DEMOCRACY 59 60 (2003); Richard A. Posner,
Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND
CULTURE 235, 238 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). In another article, I provide an extensive discussion of
pragmatism in the context of law. Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 565 (2007). The variety of Legal Pragmatism
referenced above is what I call "eclectic pragmatism" due to its voracious capacity for seemingly inconsistent
attitudes regarding modes of legal reasoning. Id. at 590-94. The two rival forms of legal pragmatism are
"economic pragmatism" and "experimental pragmatism." See id. at 595 96, 611 14.
36 See Kennedy, supra note 34, at 1073-75: Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 590-94.
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The characterization of pragmatism as a style of legal reasoning constitutes
this Article's first argument. The Article's second move follows from the first:
a focus on style has its uses. Returning to the Empagran decision, a focus on
style reveals a great deal about how the Court found its way from what was in
the lower courts a very technical question of statutory interpretation to a
consideration of the balance of power in the international legal order; about
how the Court turned away from the relevant decisions in Harford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America
N.T. & S.A; 3 7 about how the Court flirted with an empirical analysis of
comparative antitrust law, but ultimately kept its distance; 38 about how the
Court was skeptical of making what threatened to be an overtly "political"
decision; 39 and about how the Court was guided by an eclectic sensibility to
balance these conflicting considerations on its way to what it perceived as the
most pragmatic result.
Beyond the facts of the Empagran decision, legal pragmatism imbues the
field of extraterritorial jurisdiction-one of the fundamental legal doctrines
40generating the passage of norms across territorial borders. Or, at least, those
extraterritoriality decisions that involve commercial law seem particularly
pragmatic. Indeed, as Jonathan Turley explained, questions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction 4 1 tend to be answered quite differently when the subject matter is
37 F. Hoffnann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 65 (2004) (citing Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
38 See id. at 163 67.
39 See id. at 163-64.
40 For general treatments, see EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO
(Cecil J. Olmstead ed., 1984); WERNER MENG, EXTATERRITORiAIE JURISI)IKTION IM OFFNTIICHEN
WIRTSCHAFTSRIECHT (1994); CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JUIRISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAl LAW (2008): Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comi, Extraterritorialinv, and
Harmonization, 42 CoLU M. J. TRANSNAT'I, L. 5 (2003): Paul Schiff Berman, The Globali ation of
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American
Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. II (1987); Harold G.
Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International
Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Kal Raustiala, The Geography (f Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501
(2005): Robert Malley, Jean Manas, & Crystal Nix, Note, Constructing the State Extra-territorially:
Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1273 (1990).
This question also implicates the field of conflict of laws, traditionally understood as a component of "private"
international law. See general l William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflictof Laws Theory: An
Argument.for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'i, L.J. 101 (1998): Joel R. Paul, Comity in International
Law, 32 HARV. INT'i, L.J. 1 (1991).
41 These questions include: Should one nation's laws be allowed to govern the affairs of another? If so,
when does one national court have jurisdiction over the controversy? How will the judgment be enforced?
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perceived as private, as opposed to public.4 2 In particular, courts have often
sided with a presumption against an exercise of extraterritorial power in the
context of environmental and labor controversies, while in the context of
antitrust matters, this presumption has been declared all but dead.43 Attention
to the style of legal reasoning at work in some of these decisions, this Article
suggests, helps explain this kind of divergence and underscores the point that
the manner in which we reason through legal questions is often just as
important as our answers.
Part I outlines the abstract characteristics of the eclectic style of pragmatist
legal reasoning and situates it against the broader background of its
philosophical counterpart. Those thinkers who have best articulated the
working elements of eclectic pragmatism are Thomas Grey, Daniel Farber, and
Richard Posner. In similar schematic form, Part II turns to the basics of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and elaborates on sovereign independence, the
"effects test," reasonableness, and comity as the key elements of the doctrine.
Part III brings together the discussions in Part I (eclectic pragmatism) and Part
II (extraterritorial jurisdiction) in a review of four major cases in the field of
extraterritorial antitrust litigation (United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa),44 Timberlane, Hartford Fire, and Empagran). This Article argues that
these cases demonstrate a steadily evolving commitment to the pragmatist
sensibility, culminating in the recent Empagran decision.
In Part IV, the discussion shifts gears. Although eclectic pragmatism-a
style of decision that balances competing considerations on its way to a
decision that has the most reasonable consequences-may be prevalent in
contemporary legal consciousness, it is not the only pragmatist sensibility
available to the jurist. In fact, there are at least two rival camps in the legal
literature that have made explicit claims on the pragmatist tradition, which I
refer to as economic pragmatism, best represented by Richard Posner,45 and
experimental pragmatism, best represented by Charles Sabel, William Simon,
and Michael Dorf.46 Drawing on techniques from economic and industrial
analysis, these styles approach the moment of legal decision with far more
Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multination Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritorialit,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 599, 601 (1984).
42 id.
43 Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight o(fComity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 564 (2000).
44 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
45 See generally POSNER, supra note 35.
46 See generally Charles Sabel & William Simon, Detabiliaion Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
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clarity and purpose than eclectic pragmatism, and ultimately are opposed to or
aligned with the philosophy of pragmatism in ways that the eclectics are not.
After introducing the elements of economic and experimental pragmatism, Part
IV demonstrates the conceivable effects of these sensibilities on the Empagran
decision.
The Conclusion argues that while economic and experimental pragmatism
certainly have their faults, they are more attuned to the distributive
consequences of legal reasoning than eclectic sensibility and, as a result, are
relatively more desirable. Furthermore, experimental pragmatism at least
attempts to make good on the promises of the classic pragmatists like William
James, John Dewey, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, while eclectic pragmatism
actually reproduces some of the very defects first identified in the machinery
of Classic Legal Thought. Despite its emphasis on action, results, and a sense
for "what works," the pragmatist sensibility is, as Roberto Unger has
explained, a status quo sensibility that "suits an institutionally conservative
politics: one that renounces persistent and cumulative tinkering with the
institutional structure and seeks, instead, to redistribute rights and resources
within that structure." 47 Eclectic pragmatism is therefore a bastardized version
of the pragmatism that initially set itself against such institutional reticence
and, as a consequence, stands as a rejection of its own, self-professed beliefs.
I. ECLECTIC PRAGMATISM: A DOMINANT STYLE OF LEGAL REASONING?
A. Pragmatism in Context: From the Vernacular to the Philosophical
Susan Haack has described the history of pragmatism as confusing,
disturbing, and chaotic. In one catalogue of criticisms, Haack dictates:
Long ago, A. 0. Lovejoy complained that there were thirteen
pragmatisms; Ralph Barton Perry suggested that pragmatism was the
result of James's misunderstanding of Peirce; and British pragmatist
F. C. S. Schiller cheerfully acknowledged that there are as many
pragmatisms as pragmatists. More recently, Rorty writes that
"'Pragmatism' is a vague, ambiguous and overworked word," while
H. 0. Mounce and Nicholas Rescher argue that there are two
pragmatisms: the honorable, descending from Peirce, and the
47 See ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENEI: PRAGMATISM UNBOUNM 52 (2007).
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dishonorable, descending from James and Dewey to Rorty and his
admirers.
48
In another article, I have attempted to consolidate these many voices into three
fundamental groups: (1) everyday pragmatism, (2) philosophical pragmatism,
and (3) legal pragmatism. 49 Everyday pragmatism is the sort that is common
in the contemporary vernacular and describes an attitude that loves results over
ideas. 50  For example, a recent New York Times article lauded the Bush
Administration for its recent move toward pragmatism and away from
conservative ideology.51 In the context of the Bush Administration's posture
against diplomatic relations with the "axis of evil," the Times noted Bush's
decision to initiate talks with Iran and Syria as an about-face away from
ideology and toward "pragmatism. ' '52 The article quoted a supporter of the
shift as saying, "[I]t's absolutely clear to me that you have to talk to who you
have to talk to, in order to get things done." 53 Whereas the pragmatist label
may have at one time been rather gauche, it now smacks of something
distinctly American. 54 Perhaps no better indicator of the rise of pragmatism is
a line from President Obama's inauguration speech, in which he plainly states
the guiding standard of a new generation: "The question we ask today is not
whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works . . .55
The problem with everyday pragmatism is that people will disagree about
which tactics work and which ones do not. The inability of the pragmatist to
provide norms in the quest for distinguishing "bad" acts from "good" acts is
not a pedestrian problem. However simplified, this is an artifact of
philosophical pragmatism, the view on truth, meaning, and knowledge
developed by thinkers like Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and
48 Susan Haack, Pragmatism, Old and New, I CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 5 (2004) (citation omitted),
reprinted in PRAGMATISM, Oi1) & NEW 18 (Susan Haack & Robert Lane eds., 2006).
49 Desautels-Stein, supra note 35.
50 Id. at 570.
51 Helene Cooper, Pragmatism in Diplomacy: Why the U.S. is Ready to Talk to Adversaries, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2007, at Al.
52 id.
53 id.
54 See generally MICHAl ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM AN) LAW: FROM PHIIOSOPHY TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 1 (2002) ("[P]ragmatism is described in this chapter as having a central role in the constitution of
the American subject."); CILASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B.
Rosenthal et al. eds., 1999); BRIAN LLOYD, LEFT OUT: PRAGMATISM, EXCEPTIONALISM, AN) THE POVERTY OF
AMERICAN MARXISM, 1890-1922 (1997); James T. Kloppenberg, Pragmatism and the Practice of History:
From Turner and Dubois to Today, 35 METAPHIILOSOPHY 202 (2004).
55 Barack H. Obama, President, United States of America, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (emphasis
added).
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John Dewey, and more recently in the so-called "neo-pragmatist" vein,
Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.56 In short, pragmatist philosophy is focused
on the benefits of context, function, empiricism, and experimentalism. 57 The
philosophy can be grossly summarized in the following way: (1) "truth" is best
understood as a compliment one group of people have attributed at one
particular historical moment to a concept due to that concept's high cash-value;
(2) the domain of "means" is favored at the expense of so-called "ends;" (3)
the powers of observation, study, and the scientific method can be usefully
applied to questions of ethics and morality; (4) human beings are inevitably
committed to provisional, and not conclusive, epistemological projects due to
an inherent penchant for getting things wrong; and (5) the fact that despite our
incapacity to ever know what is really "true" or "good" in the world, we refuse
to let this fact disrupt the way in which we would ordinarily live in it: even
with our eyes closed, the show must go on.
58
B. Legal Pragmatism and the Eclectic Style
Eclectic pragmatism 59 represents the manifestation of the everyday
pragmatist attitude as a style of legal reasoning. It is a style that is essentially
characterized by an accommodating impulse that enables the decider to
confidently reason with a can-do attitude, balancing conflicting considerations
as needed. 60 This eclectic method, or to use Duncan Kennedy's phrase, policy
analysis, involves "the commitment to balancing conflicting policies, with an
eye to consequences, in a context in which rules represent no more than the
means to implement the resulting compromise. ' 61 The eclectic style therefore
56 For a history, see generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CiUB (2001). For collections of the
classic texts, see PRAGMATISM (Alan Malachowski ed., 2005); PRAGMATISM: A READER (Louis Menand ed.,
2001).
57 RICHAR RORTY, PHILOSOPHY ANI) THE MIRROR OF NATt RE 176, 195, 308 (1979).
58 See id.; RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMAISM xiv (1982); RJCHARI) RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOII)ARITY 5 (1989): HiiARY PUTNAM, THE COIIAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY 30 31,102 (2002); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND, HISTORY 168 7 (1981).
59 The best representatives of this view are Thomas Grey and Daniel Farber and to a lesser extent, Cass
Sunstein. See Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1590 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788
(1989) [hereinafter Grey, Holmes]; Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
21, 21 22 (1996) [hereinafter Grey, Freestanding]. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over
Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851 (2003): Daniel A.
Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal
Pragmatism]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE- AT A TIME (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
6() See Kennedy, supra note 34, at 1072.
61 Id. at 1073.
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has a taste for consequentialism with a mild dose of empirical study and
historical context, a lukewarm dissatisfaction with legal formalism and grand
theory, a preoccupation with adjudication, and a hope for apolitical decisions.
This issue of politicized decision-making is a crucial one for the eclectic
pragmatist. In contrast to philosophical pragmatism and its aim to clear one's
head of superstitions, fetishes, and reified ideas about truth, meaning, and
knowledge, eclectics look for the status quo.62 Following the lead of Richard
Rorty, the eclectic pragmatist believes that philosophical epiphanies simply
have nothing to contribute to legal reasoning. 63 The eclectic style therefore
observes a very strict division between the work philosophical pragmatism
does for personal metaphysics and political empowerment on the one hand,
and on the other the rather conventional work that an emphasis on context and
history provides in the domain of legal reasoning.
64
Pushing against philosophy, the eclectic asks: It may very well be the case
that a person will come to a pragmatist point of view on epistemological and
metaphysical questions on the right and the good, but what does this have to do
with the very practical work of legal reasoning? In making this distinction
clear, Thomas Grey introduced the example of two lawyer friends: a deeply
theistic Christian and a humanist atheist. 65 They wildly diverge on their views
of foundationalism and truth, but both agree that legal analysis should be
rooted in custom and practice, proceed instrumentally such that it serves the
human good, and shy away from formal and over-inclusive legal theories in
favor of experimental case-by-case trial and error.66 There is, therefore, little
connection between a person's philosophical views and their choices on
whether to adopt certain styles of legal reasoning. Classical pragmatist
philosophy, on this view, should have little to say about legal pragmatism.
The result for Grey is the separation of philosophy from law: freestanding
legal pragmatism. 67 Many scholars appear to agree that freestanding legal
pragmatism is not very exciting. 68 The exhilaration and exuberance affiliated
62 See Grey, Freestanding, supra note 59, at 23.
63 Id. at 21.
64 See id. at 22, 28.
65 Id. at 38-42.
66 Id. at 39-41.
67 Id. at 28.
68 Richard Posner, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Rorty, and Thomas Grey have all commented approvingly
on the "banality" of legal pragmatism. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Qffer Lai?, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1653 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and Trite Banalitv, il
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991): Richard Rorty, The
DriESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
2008] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & ANTITRUST 513
with tearing the walls of history asunder is nowhere to be found in the
freestanding, eclectic style. It is, in fact, particularly banal-a middle of the
road approach to legal reasoning and adjudication that mediates the pulls
between competing economic and cultural approaches to the law. This
characteristic, however, is not a problem for eclectics. It is rather an
advantage-a mediating force between the foundational pitfalls of grand
theory and the anti-intellectualism of a "business-as-usual" approach. 69 The
style, as mentioned above, makes good on the basic pragmatist anti-
foundational moves in the valance of contextual and instrumental argument,
but it stays its hand from the philosophical muscle that renders legal decision-
making a metaphysical enterprise in the Holmesian style.
70
For more on the banality of this approach, consider the second legal scholar
in this category. Along with Grey, Daniel Farber stands among those
associated with eclectic pragmatism.71 For Farber, the key idea is a critique of
foundationalism and an emphasis on "context, judgment, and community., 72
This view has several advantages, including the recognition of enduring
disagreement and conflict within a particular political community.73 Since
conflict will be ever-present, it is important to deal with problems
incrementally and flexibly. A foundational approach based on first principles
cannot do this since it will be either connected up with hard precedents
established by a previous community facing different problems or universal
principles assumed to answer all questions for all time.74 This eclectic view
also has the advantage of being concerned with the consequences of judicial
action, where a foundational view will steer decision-making along a pre-
determined course oblivious of how case-specific arrangement actually affects
the lives of real people.75 Furthermore, this type of pragmatism has the added
advantages of having respect for precedent when such respect is necessary, as
well as a commitment to fundamental rights.76 Farber's pragmatism, therefore,
Banality qf Pragmatism and the Poety
' 
of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1811 (1990); Grey, Holmes, supra
note 59, at 814.
69 Grey, Freestanding, supra note 59, at 38.
70 Grey, Holmes, supra note 59, at 798-99.
71 The following discussion is primarily focused on Farber's thinking in the context of constitutional law.
In administrative contexts, it may be that he is better captured in the experimentalist vein of legal pragmatism.
72 Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 59, at 1335.
71 Id. at 1342-43.
74 Id. at 1343.
75 Id. at 1342-43.
76 Id. at 1344-47.
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appears to have its anti-foundational cake, and the fundamental right to eat it,
too.
7 7
All in all, the eclectic style brings to bear these general propositions on
legal decision-making that allows for a minimalist, case-by-case balancing
approach. As a jurist, wary in the shadow of "political decision," considers the
various conflicts extant in the instant decision-the pull of precedent, policy
consequences, the stability of the legal system, and even the advantages of
"rights-talk"-she picks and chooses, in a rather eclectic way, her way to a
conclusion.
II. THE LAW OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
A. Pragmatism in International Law
One of the foundational questions of the international legal order has been
how to make sense out of the apparent paradox of a world of multiple,
sovereign authorities.78 Two of the chief theories for explaining the nature of
authority in international law, and how authority could justifiably be wielded,
were naturalism and positivism.79 Over the course of the twentieth century,
naturalism and positivism gave way to a modern conceptual framework, which
David Kennedy has described as a paradoxical post-war pragmatism: 80 "[t]his
pragmatic sentiment distinguishes policy fashion precisely by its sophisticated
attitude about the death of sovereign forms. At the same time, an often
paradoxical call for a reinvigoration of international public life is also
characteristic of this style." 81 Kennedy argues that Hans Kelsen, legal theorist
and public international law scholar, and John Jackson, trade lawyer and
economist, exemplify different ends of the pragmatic spectrum that came to
dominate modem thinking about the international legal order. 82 In this story,
Kelsen is a reminder of the profession's "fealty to a rejected sovereignty," but
not to the actual rejection of sovereignty itself.8 3 At the same time, Jackson
7 See id. at 1348-49.
78 See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 55 (2001);
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, International Legal Order as an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT'I L. 244 (1979).
79 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-48
(2004): ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 135 (1954). See generally
ALFRED P. RUBIN, ETHCS AN AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997).
80 David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 7, 19 (1994).
81 Id. at 9-10.
82 Id. at 18.
83 Id. at 10.
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represents the technocratic, can-do attitude of the American erection of the
international institutions, policy proposal, and generally dismissive attitude
with respect to grand theory. As Kennedy says, "Jackson is our disappointing
reality, Kelsen our failed dreams," but both are pragmatists.84 Importantly, it is
precisely with this shared vision that one can find the mainstay of the
internationalist sensibility, and that concerns a shared critique of sovereignty, a
shared sense that sovereignty must nevertheless live on, and a shared
"commit[ment] to an image of ... law and politics which condenses public
order in the activist sovereign and projects it forward as activism on the base of
commercial and civil fact.' 85  More generally, Kennedy describes the
pragmatist:
All postwar international pragmatists have been rebels against form,
ideology, religion, and parochialism. All have promoted a
universalist respect for fact-based particularism and the "case-by-
case" approach, even when their policies have repeated a sort of
liberal pluralism for all seasons. They have been ethical relativists
and committed pluralists, who have approached problems
functionally and purposively. They have championed technocratic,
administrative solutions, their institutional structures oriented only
intuitively by broad principles and personal commitments. Their
products are the programs, budgets, rights, treaties, doctrines and
commentaries, interventions, justifications, and pedagogies we now
know as the disciplines of international law, international relations,
and international institutions.
86
Kennedy does not use the language of everyday, philosophical, eclectic,
economic, and experimental pragmatism. 87 Instead, he appears to refer to all
84 Id. at 11.
85 Id. at 28.
6 Id. at 23.
87 David Kennedy has positioned himself in a rather interesting way with respect to the map of legal
pragmatism as presented in this article. In works like The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy,
supra note 80, at 19, Kennedy is clearly coming out against pragmatism as a sensibility which tends to mask
the blind-spots immanent in the alliance between the Kelsens and Jacksons of the international legal world.
Yet, in a recent piece, Kennedy situates himself as a pragmatist, calling on his disciplinary colleagues to be
more pragmatic: "[W]e should redouble our efforts to be pragmatic, to disenchant our tools and ourselves, to
weigh more carefully the benefits and costs of apparent successes and be guided by consequences rather than
forms." DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE 328 (2004). Kennedy is speaking in the very
comfortable language of costs, benefits, and consequences a language with which all international
humanitarians are familiar. Id. Even more, there are echoes of Posner's emphasis on the pragmatist's need to
indulge in both consequentialist and formal means when times require: "The one seems effective, the other
principled, their steps elegantly coordinated by pragmatism." Id. at 339. It seems totally wrong to place
Kennedy in either the eclectic or economic camps, however, precisely for his emphasis on the
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of these varieties at one point or another in his construction of the "pragmatist
sensibility": the anti -theoretical, "just do it" attitude of the everyday
pragmatist; the anti-foundational, anti-formalist attitude of the classical
pragmatist; the anti-ideological, accommodating dilettantism of the eclectic
pragmatist; the reasonableness/efficiency fascination of the economic
pragmatist; as well as the empiricism of the experimental pragmatist-these all
appear in Kennedy's picture. 8 8 The argument that follows should therefore be
read as the beginning of an illustration of Kennedy's more general references
to the pragmatist sensibility in the international legal order.
B. Sovereignty/Jurisdiction and Internal/External Rules
Extraterritorial jurisdiction means what it says: the assertion of a state's
legal power beyond its borders.89 At first blush, the concept of extraterritorial
jurisdiction appears to contradict one of the classic premises of international
law, namely the notion of state sovereignty. 90 If, for example, a sovereign state
has the unfettered right to determine for itself how its national political, social,
and economic affairs will be arranged, 91 does this right not conflict with
another state's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction? Indeed, the concept of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is hotly contested, and though there have been
attempts at codifying a set of international rules for the exercise of
92
extraterritorial power, there remains a lack of consensus.
"disenchant[ment] of our tools and ourselves." Id. at 328. Further, Kennedy's claim that the shared
vocabulary of the humanitarian is undeniably political, and his emphasis on the "rulership of expertise" is out
of step with the status-quo orientation of the eclectic and the welfarism of the economist. As a result, perhaps
it is best to read Kennedy's praise for pragmatism in international law as little more than a pragmatic
performance itself, speaking in the voice he believes will have the best chance of being heard.
88 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89 See Berman, supra note 40, at 317-19.
9o Id.
91 For modem accounts of state sovereignty, see The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 1.C.J 4
(Apr. 9); HANS KELSEN, LAW AN) PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77 78 (1942). For more recent
statements, see generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 26 28
(1998): THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAl LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 3 (1995): DAVID HEILI),
GLOBAL COVENANT 161 62 (2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER 12 (2004); John H.
Jackson, Sovereignt.-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'l L. 782 (2003);
Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty ii International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTFMP. PiOBS. 293, 295-98 (1993).
92 See A. V. Lowe, The Problems qf Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search
f!r a Solution, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 724, 732 (1985). See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Karl Matthias Meessen ed., 1996).
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As has been repeatedly explained, sovereignty is an unstable concept.93 In
contrast to the idea that states are self-contained and self-determined political
entities is the counterview that states are largely subject to the global balance
of power.94 After all, the only way in which nation-states could truly exercise
an unfettered right to self-determination would be to imagine a world in which
the acts of one state never affected the affairs of another. Since this is not the
world in which we live, this alternative view holds that the international
community is not comprised of sovereign states at all, but of unequal actors,
each with its own stake in maintaining a predictable society that will yield the
greatest degree of sovereign prerogatives.95 Just like the images of Kelsen and
Jackson, these contradictory positions-"states are autonomous" and "states
are not autonomous"-pragmatically live side by side in the international legal
lexicon, where the claims of the real, concrete, and sovereign and those of the
ideal, abstract, and international inevitably push back and forth on one
another.
96
The concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction sits at the center of this
contradiction, mediating the back and forth between arguments for and against
the sanctity of sovereign borders. The law of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
similarly splintered. In the United States, jurisdiction is understood to
"prescribe" (the power to apply one state's law to the residents of another),
"adjudicate" (the power to hear foreign claims in the home state's courts), and
"enforce" (the power to provide remedies for foreign injuries or compel
93 For recent criticisms, see CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 91, at 26 28; FRANCK, supra note
91, at 3: HEID, supra 91, at 161-62: SILAUGHTER, supra note 91, at 2: Jackson, supra note 91, at 782; Knop,
supra note 91, at 295-98.
94 See HANS MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 8 (6th ed. 1985) (1948): Myres McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM J. INT'l L. 102 (1952):
Shirley Scott, International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship Between International Law and
International Politics, 5 EVI. J. INT'l L. 313, 314 (1994). For discussions regarding the circular structure of
international legal arguments, see MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 192 263 (1989); David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2
AM. U. J. INT'l. L. & Po'Y I, 89 (1987); Kennedy, supra note 80, at 9-10.
95 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 94, at 192 93. In this way, the international order tracks the basic
principles of liberal political philosophy. See SUSAN MARKS, THE RImI)IE OF AiIF CONSTITUTIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 39-40 (2000). See generally GERRY
SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (2004).
96 DAvID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 196 97 (1987); KOsKENNIEMI, supra note 94,
at 192-263.
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compliance). 97  When a state exercises these powers within its borders, it is
applying what is sometimes referred to as its internal rules. 98  External rules,
on the other hand, regulate those moments when states assert their
jurisdictional powers beyond their territorial boundaries. 99 A nation's external
rules are therefore extraterritorial in nature.100  Predictably, much of the rub in
jurisdictional discourse involves figuring out: (1) when an internal rule morphs
into an external rule; and (2) when external rules apply at all.10 1
C. The Rules of Jurisdiction
1. Comity
In the United States, a court's inquiry into whether an exercise of
extraterritorial power is warranted begins with the recollection that jurisdiction
is fundamentally territorial, 10 2 giving rise to a presumption against the exercise
97 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-12 (1998). Section 401 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts this tri-partite division as well.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UN1ED STATES § 401 (1987).
98 MICHAEl BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL REI ATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1999).
I d. at 65. In the Lotus Case, the Permanent International Court of Justice stated:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules ....
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7).
I0( See BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 310-12; BYERS, supra note 98, at 65; ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAl. LAW 451-52 (2005). Other bases for jurisdiction include nationality and universality.
CASSESE, supra, at 451 52. Nationality, unlike universality, has enjoyed historical consensus as a legitimate
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. For a discussion of the nationality principle and other bases for
jurisdiction, see BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 301 05.
101 The distinction between the reality and function of such external and internal rules presupposes a host
of assumptions on territoriality and national membership. To do away with such assumptions highlights
territoriality as a legal concept and opens the door to a socio-political analysis of extraterritoriality. Although
the Conclusion hints at this issue, a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For the fundamental
explanation on how to look at legal concepts in this way, see Hohfeld, supra note 14, at 32-44.
102 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) ("All legislation is prima
fi'cie territorial."); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territorv (A Histon, of'Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999).
Malley, Manas, and Nix argue that this relationship between sovereignty and land has a productive function in
that it helps to constitute the ideas of national membership and national interest, which they argue to be central
to the jurisdictional vocabulary:
The identification of the state with a territorially enclosed nation has infused jurisdictional
rhetoric with metaphors of space, inclusion, and exclusion. The state is thus depicted as a realm
to which one belongs or from which one is banned, whose interests one serves or one injures, and
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of jurisdiction by one state over the citizens of another state when the dispute
takes place beyond the home state's territory.' Stated differently, there is a
presumption of non-interference with a foreign set of internal rules through the
assertion of the home state's external rules. Although the presumption against
extraterritorial jurisdiction has at its core the principle that states are
autonomous, it is also assisted by the concept of comity.
10 4
Comity can neither be derived from treaty nor customary law, and yet it has
been interpreted to mean everything from binding obligation to international
etiquette. 05 This principle received its initial treatment in the work of Joseph
whose sovereignty should be respected but is persistently at risk. Territoriality, citizenship, and
reasonableness categories all reiterate this dichotomy between what is and what is not in the
nation -state's best interest.
Malley et al., supra note 40, at 1286. Although this Article does not focus on the effects of national
membership on extraterritoriality, it is clearly an important part of the working vocabulary. Malley, Manas,
and Nix seek to deconstruct the "national interest" as a legal concept, whereas I am less concerned with the
illusion of territorial and national memberships than I am with the means by which courts appear to shuffle
back and forth between the central terms. See generally id. For more on nationality in international law, see
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RiSE OF NATIONS (Robert J. Beck & Thomas Ambrosio eds., 2002): Justin
Desautels-Stein, Comment, National Identitv and Liberalism in International Law: Three Models, 31 N.C. J.
INT'l, L. & COMM. REG. 463 (2005). The seminal case is S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No.
10 (Sept. 7). lan Brownlie writes:
Municipal courts are often reluctant to assume jurisdiction in cases concerning a foreign element
and adhere to the territorial principle conditioned by the situs of the facts in issue, and
supplemented by criteria relating to the concepts of allegiance or domicile and doctrines of prior
express submission to the jurisdiction and of tacit submission, for example on the basis of the
ownership of property in the state of the forum.
BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 302.
103 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163 (2004); American Banana Co.,
213 U.S. at 357. For arguments against the presumption, see Turley, supra note 41: Gary B. Born, A
Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992); William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritorialit,, 16 BERKEI EY J. INT'I L. 85 (1998)
(discussing extraterritoriality in the context of antitrust); Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of
Extraterritoriality and the Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT'l &
COMP. L. REV. 177 (1997).
104 See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164 65.
105 Paul, supra note 40, at 3-4. Joel Paul writes:
Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule of international law, a
synonym for private international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience
or goodwill between sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or "considerations of
high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships
between nations."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Story 106 and was first instantiated in American jurisprudence by Hilton v.
Guyot:
Comity in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation
on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
10 7
At the same time, there exists a healthy counter-tendency to resist comity
and the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, l10 motivated in part by
the common view that transnational problems call for transnational answers.09
To be sure, sovereign interdependence and the global economy have long
undermined the territorial principle' 0 Today, however, the perception is that
these global constraints are greater than ever and that territorial jurisdiction
cannot make sense out of most situations that involve spillover effects-the
impact that domestic behaviors have on foreign territories. 112
In the context of extraterritorial antitrust litigation, discussed further below,
Jonathan Turley explains that judicial hostility towards the presumption against
extraterritorial jurisdiction is at its peak in "market" cases, whereas in the
context of environmental or labor cases, the presumption is shored up.u 3 For
market cases, Turley argues, courts proceed from a territorial presumption
106 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1834).
107 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
108 BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 301 02.
109 For representative works, see GOVERNANCE IN A GIFOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D.
Donahue eds., 2000); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1995); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS (1998); LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein et al.
eds., 2001); DANI RoDRIK, HAS GIOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997).
1I0 See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE 8 9
(1999).
1 See THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
112 See HELD ET AL., supra note 110, at 8 9. Though "democratic deficit" is typically a term at home in
the field of economics, it also resonates in political philosophy. For a discussion of this application, see SUSAN
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament,
80 FOREIGN AFF. 212 (Jan.-Feb. 2001): James N. Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globali ing
World, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 28 (Daniele
Archibugi et al. eds., 1998); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001); Michael Zum, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and
Other International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 191 (2000).
113 Turley, supra note 41, at 634-36.
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rebuttable in conventional terms as described earlier.' 14 In public law or non-
market cases, by contrast, courts tend to focus much more tenaciously on the
other side of the presumption against external rules: Congress must have
explicitly intended that the law have extraterritorial effect. 1 5 If there was no
intent, there is no jurisdiction. 1 6
Turley's analysis conforms to the view that courts are generally more
oblivious to the political choices common to commercial adjudications than
they are to those in public law decisions. 17 That is, if courts shy away from
externalizing public law rules due to their overtly political status (thus
abstaining from extraterritoriality in the absence of a clear congressional
intent), courts are more audacious in the less political terrain of the global
economy.
The upshot is that jurisdictional discourse will begin from the same
departure point regardless of its doctrinal subject-employing a presumption
against prescriptive jurisdiction, rooted in comity and in the absence of
congressional intent-but proceeds quite differently as it addresses more or
less political subject areas. This is one of the typical blind spots found in the
disciplinary alliance between public international and international economic
laws' perspectives on politics and law, characterized by Kennedy as the shared
pragmatist sensibility.' 18
114 id.
115 id.
116 id.
117 See id. at 634 37. See generally Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility far International Economic
Development, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209 (1997); David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the
Box. 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'I L. & Pol.. 335 (2000): Robert Wai, Transnational Li qffand Juridical Touchdown:
The Regulaton, Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 209 (2002).
118 Kennedy writes:
At the moment, American international lawyers on the right tend to be formalists about American
sovereign prerogatives and strict interpreters of the commitments of foreign powers, particularly
to respect property rights and the prerogatives of international institutions, but very expansive
and policy-oriented when it comes to interpreting restrictions on U.S. power abroad. American
international lawyers on the left are more likely to be rule-oriented when it comes to American
obligations and far less worried about the formalities of multilateral or international institutional
initiatives. Political affiliations of this type contribute to the argumentative instability of the
profession's intellectual terrain and to the general sense that everyone is an eclectic or post-
intellectual pragmatist.
Kennedy, supra note 117, at 439.
DLESAU IELS -S 1EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
522 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
What is noteworthy for the present discussion is that the conventional
picture of jurisdictional discourse generally relates to doctrinal subjects
considered less political and more inevitable, such as antitrust.'l 9  This
tendency of extraterritorial antitrust toward the seemingly apolitical is also
apiece with eclectic pragmatism. As discussed above, Grey explains that
pragmatism can be freestanding of its philosophical parent, cutting off the
political energies available to the economists and experimentalists. 12  A court
performing in the eclectic style distances itself, hoping to steer clear of the
politics conventionally circumscribed by the public sphere. This is why, as
Turley argues, non-market doctrines shuffle the terms of jurisdictional
discourse by placing a premium on congressional intent.' 2  If the doctrine is
non-market, it must be political. And since the eclectic is simply ill-equipped
for that kind of speech, he queasily turns away. 122  In sharp contrast, the
eclectic style works best when the topic is technocratic, and the decider is able
to shift back and forth between functionalism and formalism as the case
demands.
2. The Effects Test and the Rule of Reasonableness
The "effects test," in Ian Brownlie's words, requires a "principle of
substantial and genuine connection between the subject matter of jurisdiction,
and the territorial base and reasonable interests of the jurisdiction sought to be
• ,23
exercised." The effects test entered American jurisprudence in Alcoa, where
Judge Learned Hand, adjudicating a foreign aluminum cartel case, held that a
prima facie presumption in favor of territorial jurisdiction should give way
when the consequences of foreign conduct are evident on American soil.
124
119 The government of the United Kingdom, for example, has noted this development and argued with
disapproval: "There is nothing in the nature of anti-trust proceedings which justifies a wider application of
these principles than is generally accepted in other matters; on the contrary there is much which calls for a
narrower application." British Aide-Memoire to the Commission of European Communities, Oct. 20, 1969
reprinted in BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 317. For a discussion on the normative aspects of antitrust doctrine,
see Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago
Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 CoItUM. Bus. L. REV. 257 (2001); Michael S. Jacobs, The Normative
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1995); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market:
A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1999).
120 Grey, Freestanding, supra note 59, at 21 22, 37 38.
121 Turley, supra note 41, at 601-02.
122 See id. at 601-02, 634-36.
123 BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 301.
124 United States v. Aluminum Co. of American (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
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There has been disagreement among U.S. courts as to whether the corporation
must have intended these domestic effects to trigger jurisdiction . 2 5
In addition to comity and the effects test, another means for figuring out
when and where external rules apply is found in the Restatement (Third) on the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 126 which has sometimes been
called a "jurisdictional rule of reason."'1 27  In the Restatement, the rule of
reasonableness 128 is recognized as a principle of customary international
law, 129 and reasonableness, according to the Restatement, should serve as a
significant lever in the disposition of jurisdictional discourse.' 3 Accordingly:
Jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to transnational activity
depends not on a particular link, such as minimum contacts ("use of
the mails," or "crossing state lines"), which have been used to define
"subject matter jurisdiction" for constitutional purposes, but on a
concept of reasonableness based on a number of factors to be
considered and evaluated.
131
125 Roger Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European
Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 n.44 (1992). Alford includes the following in his short list of
contrasting cases: Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969) (omitting intent
requirement); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1184 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(requiring general intent); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (general intent); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 889 91 (D.N.J. 1949) (general
intent): United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), af"d, 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(requiring specific intent). Alford, supra, at 9 n.44.
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
127 For a discussion of the jurisdictional rule of reason, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AN) THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS (1996). For a discussion of the history of the idea, see
KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST ANT) AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); BROWNILIE, supra note 97, at
310 12; Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust-Is "Reason bleness" the Answer?, in 1986
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 49. 54-60 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application qf
American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Prqfessors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 750 (1995); David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary International
Law: The Reasonableness Requirement qfthe Restatement qf Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT'l L. 419
(1997); Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts (o' Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
47 (1987).
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 403, 421, 431
(1987).
129 See id. § 403 cmt. a. The Reporter's Notes cite several cases for the proposition that U.S. courts tend
to refrain from principled jurisdictional discourse in favor of balancing tests, among them Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank qf America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597. 614 (9th Cir. 1976), and Mannington Mills, 1nc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 99 (3d Cir. 1979). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
REILATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, Reporter's Notes (6) (1987).
1") RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401, 403, cmt. d
(1987).
13 Jd.§401,cmt. c.
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This is not to say, however, that jurisdiction may only be exercised when it is
reasonable. Section 402, which outlines the bases of the jurisdiction to
prescribe, embraces the traditional jurisdictional justifications based on
territory, nationality, and an effects test ("conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory"). 132 Section 402 is,
however, subject to the limitations found in section 403, namely, a rule of
reasonableness: "Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under section 402
is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.' ' 33 Section 403 lists a number of factors that
should guide a legal decision-maker when determining whether jurisdictional
exercise is reasonable.' 
34
The comment to section 403 explains that reasonableness should not be
confused with comity. 13  Comity has at times been understood as a courtesy
among states and dependent on reciprocal relationships. 136  The Restatement
distances the rule of reasonableness from comity, stating that reasonableness is
an actual rule of customary international law and therefore cannot be
disregarded by a court, even if that court perceives a foreign court as failing to
reciprocate.
137
132 Id. § 402(1)(c).
133 Id. § 403(1).
134 Id. § 403(2). The factors are:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or
in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating
state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state
and those whom the regulation is designed to protect:
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system:
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
135 See id. § 403 cmt. a.
136 id.
137 See id. For discussion, see RYNGAERT, supra note 40, at 134-84.
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Taken together, these three principles outline the basic terms of
conventional jurisdictional discourse: (1) a threshold presumption that U.S. law
is territorial in its application, rooted in principles of comity, non-intervention,
and sovereign equality; (2) a possibility to rebut this presumption when a
decision-maker identifies a substantial and bona fide connection between the
subject-matter and source of jurisdiction; and (3) a general police provision in
a jurisdictional rule of reason demanding the exercise of external rules in
conformity with the balancing test.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST AND THE PRAGMATIST STYLE
Over the course of the twentieth century, the field of antitrust law
dominated extraterritoriality discourse.1 38  This is not to say that courts have
ever characterized antitrust issues as inherently more hostile to border controls
than other doctrinal areas, such as the environment, human rights, or labor
regimes. 139  Rather, there exists a sense that something inevitably pushes
antitrust governance against territorial restraints in ways that the others do
not. 140 Comity-one of the traditional grounds that polices the assertion of
138 Turley, supra note 41, at 599: BROWNIIE, supra note 97, at 310 ("In the field of economic regulation,
and especially anti-trust legislation, controversy has arisen."). For representative discussions, see Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Jurisdictional Cnflict in Global Antitrust Enforcement, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 365 (2004);
Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra- Territorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws:
A Proposalfor an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. LJ 883 (1984): Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S.
and EU Antitrust Enjbrcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999 2000); R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957); Karl M. Meessen,
Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'l L. 783 (1984); Edward T. Swaine,
The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (2001).
139 See EXTRATERRITORIAL APPEiICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004); Browne C. Lewis, It's a Small World After All: Making the Case for the
Extraterritorial Application qf the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 2143 (2004)
(discussing extraterritorial jurisdiction and environmental law): Stephen B. Moldof, The Application of U.S.
Labor Laws to Activities and Employees Outside the United States, 17 LAB. LAW. 417 (2002) (discussing labor
law and extraterritoriality); Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under
Extraterritoriality and the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671 (2003) (discussing human rights
enforcement and extraterritorial jurisdiction).
140 For a discussion of the "global antitrust" movement, see COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Michael S. Greve & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2004); MAHER M.
DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust
and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911 (2003); Andrew Guzman, The Casefbr International Antitrust, 22
BEIRKELEY J. INT'l L. 355 (2004); Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private
Enfibrcement in a Global Market, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 409 (2004); Charles W. Smitherman, The
Future of Global Competition Governan e: Lessons from the Transatlantic, 13 AM. U. INT'l L. REV. 769
(2004): Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (2005). Antitrust coursebooks are also emphasizing the global nature of the new
antitrust jurisprudence. See, e.g., EINER EiHAUGE & DAMIEN GERAIDIN, GFOBAI ANTITRUST LAW AND
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external rules in jurisdictional discourse-has even been declared dead when it
comes to the inevitably progressive march of the antitrust regime. 14 1 In the
Empagran decision, the Supreme Court reinforced this idea even as it held
against extraterritorial assertion in that case:
No one denies that America's antitrust laws, when applied to foreign
conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation's ability independently to
regulate its own commercial affairs. But our courts have long held
that application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive
conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with
principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative
effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive
conduct has caused.
142
A. From Alcoa to Empagran
1. Alcoa and the Effects Test
Alcoa represents the seminal pragmatist decision in the field of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, highlighting the importance of purposive,
functional jurisprudence. 143  Decided in 1945, Alcoa involved a U.S.-based
aluminum company that had enjoyed a number of patents on aluminum
products. 44 After a consent decree curtailed certain agreements with Alcoa's
foreign competitors on the sale of aluminum in the United States, the
Department of Justice brought a monopoly claim against Alcoa under the
Sherman Act.' 4 5 The court, showing a strong interest in exercising jurisdiction
over activities characterized by their consequences, and not so much by their
nature, explained:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States. On the other hand, it is settled law ... that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
EcONOMICS (2007); ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL
CONTEXT (2d ed. 2004).
141 See generally Waller, supra note 43 (arguing that the practical necessities of global competition have
ushered in comity's end).
142 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
143 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
144 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422.
145 Id. at 421.
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for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends .... 146
Finding that the agreements were intended to, and in fact did, have an effect on
the U.S. aluminum market, the court applied American antitrust law beyond
U.S. borders.
147
2. The Consequentialism of Timberlane
Another hefty weapon in the eclectic pragmatist's toolbox is policy
balancing, eventually articulated in the Restatement. 148 Although balancing is
often understood as a rival form of jurisdictional discourse, it shares the
pragmatist sensibility found in the effects test. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, the plaintiffs claimed that Bank of America officials in
Honduras and the United States prevented Timberlane from entering the
lumber export business controlled by the bank. 149 At the district court level,
Timberlane's claim was dismissed due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
(using the effects test, the court did not find an impact where it mattered) and
the act of state doctrine. 150  After citing the rationale for the act of state
doctrine-that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory"151-the court explained that the doctrine is based on a concern to
avoid the "political branches of the government" and their foreign relations
responsibilities.I52 What was important for adjudication was not adherence to
some formal rule of non-interference, but an ad hoc determination of whether
the foreign conduct was political enough to warrant the stay of American
law. 153 The court said that if a particular practice is mandated by foreign law,
146 Id. at 443 (citations omitted). The court thus upheld extraterritoriality based on "settled law," despite
Justice Holmes's claim 30 years earlier that the idea of extraterritorial jurisdiction was "startling." American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909). Ironically, the least pragmatic of the major
extraterritorial antitrust decisions came from a jurist that many claim to be the founding father of legal
pragmatism Holmes, in American Banana. For Holmes, the question had little to do with what made sense
or whether assertions of American law onto foreign conduct were useful. There was a principle in play, that of
territoriality, and it governed with an iron fist. See id. at 357.
147 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
148 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
149 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1977).
150 i d.
151 Id. at 605 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
152 id.
153 Id. at 614-15.
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U.S. courts might be prevented from jurisdictional application.' 54  When the
conduct is merely enabled by foreign law, however, the conduct is necessarily
less political and more susceptible to U.S. law.'
55
The court held that, on the Timberlane facts, the involvement of Honduran
government officials did not rise to the level of politics that would implicate
the act of state doctrine because:
the allegedly "sovereign" acts of Honduras consisted of judicial
proceedings which were initiated by Caminals, a private party and
one of the alleged co-conspirators, not by the Honduran government
itself . . . . Timberlane does not seek to name Honduras or any
Honduran officer as a defendant or co-conspirator, nor does it
challenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any fashion that appears
on its face to hold any threat to relations between Honduras and the
United States. In fact, there is no indication that the actions of the
Honduran court and authorities reflected a sovereign decision that
Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or that trade with the United
States should be restrained. 
156
Next, the court embarked on the balancing route later taken up in the
Restatement. 157  Reflecting on the less than obvious nature of what should
count as a direct and substantial effect, as well as the logic of always finding
jurisdiction as long as there has been an effect, 158 the court articulated a
discursive approach that would turn on the established criteria of effects and
nationality, as well as comity concerns regarding the impact of jurisdiction on
foreign governments. 159 Thus, the Timberlane test can be seen as an extension
of the effects test in that it requires a more involved consequentialist
154 See id. at 606.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 608.
157 Id. at 613-15.
151 See id. at 611.
159 Id. at 614. The full test is described as follows:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these factors
should identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted.
Id. (citations omitted).
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determination. The court seemed to suggest that a finding that foreign conduct
affected the United States is by itself too much of a fetish.' 60  The crux of
jurisdictional authority should turn instead on a more thoroughly wrought
understanding of the impact of the conduct, as well as the impact of
jurisdictional power on a foreign state. 161 That is, jurisdictional exercise will
be considered, but only so long as the conduct in question is not political-
defined as the public exercise of affirmative legal obligation by a sovereign.
162
3. The Apolitical Attitude in Hartford Fire
Many commentators saw the Hartford Fire Supreme Court decision in
1993 as a rebuke of the balancing approach articulated by the Ninth Circuit, as
well as the method found in the Restatement, favoring a more principled or
formalist understanding of extraterritoriality.' 63 The Hartford Fire plaintiffs
were several U.S. states, including California, which claimed that a conspiracy
had emerged among London reinsurers to restrict the terms of commercial
general liability insurance in the United States.16 4 The defendants conceded
that the impact of the agreements had been felt on U.S. soil but argued that
U.S. courts should not have jurisdiction since such an application would be in
conflict with the laws of Britain. 165 Because the U.K. had its own regulatory
regime in place, and the conduct in question was legal under those regulations,
the exercise of foreign power over that activity would present a conflict.'
66
The Court did not find this argument persuasive and instead adopted the
contrary view that because nothing in British law affirmatively required the
reinsurers' conduct, and because the defendants presented no other argument
that compliance with the laws of both countries was impossible, there could be
no conflict between concurrent jurisdiction by American and British courts. 1 67
As for the comity analysis required by the jurisdictional rule of reason, the
Court ended the conversation quickly: "We have no need in this litigation to
address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the
exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity." 168
160 See id. at 611.
.6 Id. at 615.
162 See id. at 606.
163 See, e.g., Roger Alford, The Extraterritorial Application ofJAntitrust Laws: A Postscript on Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'I L. 213,213-14 (1993).
164 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Califormia, 509 U.S. 764, 764 (1993).
165 Id. at 797-99.
166 Id. at 798-99.
16' Id. at799.
168 d.
DLESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
530 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
Is Hartford Fire an affront to the Restatement and the jurisdictional rule of
reason? Sort of. It is true that the Court was curt in its comity treatment and
rejected the Timberlane approach. Andreas Lowenfeld, a primary author of the
Restatement and counsel in Hartford Fire, has said that the Court's decision
diverged from the intent of the Restatement. 169 It is also true that the decision
appeared more formalist than Alcoa and Timberlane, with its emphasis on
formulaic determinants, namely its reasoning that if there is a substantial
effect, and a foreign government has not affirmatively ordered a party to act in
such a way that can conflict with foreign law, U.S. courts can hear the case.170
What is missing from this analysis, however, is an appreciation of how
politically averse the Court happened to be in the face of these facts. While
Hartford Fire might be a step back from the thicker consequentialism and
empiricism at work in Timberlane, it nonetheless represented an affirmation of
a jurisdictional discourse interested in impact and extremely leery of political
involvement. If it is thought that Hartford Fire seems hard to square with
Timberlane, it is only because, in the hands of the majority, the eclecticism
driving the result asked less from comity and more from effects in creating
what seemed like the most useful conclusion. Indeed, more than a decade
later, the Empagran decision underscored the eclectic preoccupation with
consequences and comity.' 71 What made more sense in Hartford Fire, where
the politics of the insurance industry seemed to warrant the intervention of
American courts, made less sense in Empagran, when there was less at stake
for American commerce. Thus, comity, treated so discourteously in Hartford
Fire, was welcomed back in Empagran.
4. Empagran and the Eclectic Style
In the past several years, state, federal, and foreign courts have decided
various iterations of the historic "vitamins case." 172  Some of the claims,
169 LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 27 28.
170 See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 795-99.
171 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
172 The Empagran case has generated a considerable amount of scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Alvin K.
Klevorick & Alan 0. Sykes, United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A
Welfarist Perspective on Empagran, in ANTITRUST STORIES 361 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007); Hannah Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.
(U.S. Supreme Court 2004), 5 GERMAN L.J. 1095 (2005); Susan E. Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post
Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche." Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial
Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT'l L. REV. 555 (2004); Ronald W. Davis, Empagran and International Cartels A
Comity of Errors, 19 ANTITRUST 58 (Fall 2004) (arguing that the Court misapplied the comity concept to the
Empagran facts): Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming qf International
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brought by private parties and government agencies against a number of major
vitamin manufacturers, were price-fixing, market allocation, and the monitored
compliance by those companies of the sales volumes of vitamins, vitamins
premixes, and vitamin bulk products in the global market.' 73  The major
defendants-F. Hoffmann-La Roche (Switzerland), Lonza (Switzerland),
BASF (Germany), Eisai (Japan), E. Takeda Chemical Industries (Japan), and
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Company (Japan)-were found to have illegally
affected billions of dollars worth of commerce in vitamins and were
consequently held liable under the Sherman Act, heavily fined, and faced with
criminal charges. 174  The vitamins case is a classic example of a worldwide
price-fixing conspiracy and exactly the type of market distortion meant to be
protected against by antitrust laws. As Harry First has explained, "These cases
settle damages along a distribution chain that reaches from cattle feed lots
down to consumers of vitamin-enriched foods .... The array of jurisdictions
involved, the extent of the fines, and the potential magnitude of civil damages
that may eventually be assessed certainly seems extraordinary."'
75
The global expanse and per se nature of the offenses caused little
controversy among antitrust practitioners. In sharp contrast, one of the
vitamins case variations decided by the Supreme Court in 2004 in Empagran
has generated a great deal of debate.' 76 Unlike previous adjudications of the
vitamins case, it did not involve any American plaintiffs or defendants, thus
calling into question whether the court could properly assert subject matter
jurisdiction. 177  The plaintiffs in Empagran were corporations domiciled in
foreign countries (Ecuador, Panama, Australia, and Ukraine) that had
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001): Calvin S. Goldman et al., Comity after Empagran and Intel,
19 ANTITRUST 6 (Summer 2005); Sam Foster Halabi, The "Comity" of Empagran: The Supreme Court
Decides that Foreign Competition Regulation Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction over International
Cartels, 46 HARV. INT'i. L.J. 279 (2005); Kenneth S. Reinker, Case Comment: Roche v. Empagran, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297 (2004) (arguing that the Court failed to establish a workable standard for determining
when U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign antitrust violations): Siddharth Fernandes, Note, F. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran and the Extraterritorial Limits of United States Antitrust Jurisdiction: Where
Comity and Deterrence Collide, 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 267 (2005).
173 First, supra note 172, at 713.
174 Id. at 714 16. Another vitamin manufacturer at the center of the controversy was the French company
Rhone-Poulenc. Rhone-Poulenc was not charged in the United States, however, as it had taken advantage of
the Department of Justice's leniency policy for early reporting. Id. at 715 16.
175 Id. at719.
176 The case had a formidable list of arnicus briefs. Among them were those filed by the governments of
the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the Organization for International Investment, and scores of economists and law professors. F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 157 58 (2004).
177 See id. at 158-59.
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purchased vitamins from foreign defendants for delivery outside the United
States.178 As in previous suits, the claim was that the defendants had engaged
in price-fixing and market allocation schemes in the vitamins market, with
effects both in and outside of the United States, and that the plaintiffs had
suffered as a result. 179  The plaintiffs sought a remedy in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia under the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, foreign antitrust laws, and international law.
1 80
The district court explained that the plaintiffs' claim turned on whether the
"allegations of a global price fixing conspiracy that affects commerce both in
the United States and in other countries gives persons injured abroad in
transactions otherwise unconnected with the United States a remedy under our
antitrust laws."''8 Consequently, the contention that there had been a price-
fixing scheme was not in dispute; the matter was solely one of whether foreign
harms produced and sustained by foreign parties could be adjudicated in an
American court. 182  The district court held against the plaintiffs, denying
jurisdiction on the rationale that the plaintiffs' injuries had not been generated
by the conspiracy's anticompetitive effects on U.S. soil. 183  On appeal, the
plaintiffs argued that under the FTAIA, 184  it is unnecessary for the
178 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 342 (D.C. Cit. 2003); F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. at 159.
179 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d at 342.
180 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 2001 WL 761360, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001), rev'd,
315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
181 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d at 343 (citing Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-
La Roche, Ltd., 2001 WL 761360, at *2).
182 Id. at 357 ("There is no dispute that the foreign plaintiffs in this case have been injured by paying
inflated prices for vitamins.").
'" Id. at 343.
184 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). For a discussion, see Salil K. Mehra, A' is fbr Anachronism: The FTAIA
Meets the World Trading System, 107 DICK. L. REv. 763 (2003): Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland,
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: What is a "Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably
Foreseeable EJfect" Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT'l L.J. 11 (2003).
The text of the FTAIA states:
§ 6a. Conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade
or import commerce with foreign nations: or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or
commerce in the United States: and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than
this section.
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anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation to give rise to the plaintiffs'
actual claim. 185 Rather, those effects need only have given rise to any claim,
and to that extent, prior adjudications of the vitamins case had made clear that
such anticompetitive effects had been substantially felt within the United
States.186  In the alternative, the plaintiffs also argued that even if a more
restrictive view of the FFAIA were taken, it could be shown that the foreign
injuries were sustained as a result of distorted American vitamins commerce.187
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia accepted the plaintiffs'
reading of the FTAIA and, in so doing, left the alternate argument
unaddressed.188 The court explained that the language of the FTAIA was itself
too ambiguous to determine whether the statutorily required anticompetitive
effects should give rise to any claim on U.S. soil, or only to the plaintiffs' own
claim.189 As a result, the court determined that the
harmful effect on United States commerce must give rise to "a claim"
by someone, even if not the foreign plaintiff who is before the court.
Although the language of § 6a(2) does not plainly resolve this case,
we believe that our holding regarding the jurisdictional reach of
FTAIA is faithful to the language of the statute. We reach this
conclusion not only by virtue of our literal reading of the statute, but
also in light of the statute's legislative history and underlying policies
of deterrence .... 190
The D.C. Circuit's decision situated itself as falling "somewhere between
the views" on the FFAIA that had been articulated in recent decisions by the
Fifth and Second Circuits.1 91 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it
seemed that the argument over whether the FTAIA allowed a more or less
restrictive understanding of "gives rise to a claim" would be settled. 192 Justice
Breyer's majority opinion begins with the sense that this is precisely the issue
to be resolved. 193 The difficulty with the holding, however, is that it leaves
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
185 Empagran S.A. v.F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d at 340.
6 ld. at 340-41.
Ia d. at 341.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
1)1 Id. (citing Den Norske Stats Gijeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cit. 2001);
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC. 284 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2002)).
192 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 160. 162 (2004).
193 See id. at 159 ("[W]e ask whether the conduct nonetheless falls within a domestic-injury exception to
the general rule, an exception that applies (and makes the Sherman Act nonetheless applicable) where the
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ambiguous the question of whether a foreign plaintiff's claim will be sustained
when the foreign injury is indirectly related to anticompetitive effects in the
United States.'
94
The Court begins its analysis by pointing to two general considerations.
The second ground, which is less interesting than the first, is the idea that the
FIAIA's legislative history does not warrant an expansion of American
jurisdictional power.1 95 If anything, says the Court, the purpose of the statute
was precisely to curb such assertions, and no court has ever construed the
FTAIA in such a way when dealing with foreign parties and foreign injuries.196
It is difficult to take this argument very seriously, however, as the legislative
history of the FTAIA has been acknowledged as less than helpful.
197
Furthermore, this statement on a presumption against jurisdiction can be
understood as the Court doing little more than floating an ace, as if to say that
when a situation warrants a congressional trump, it can always be pulled. In
selecting its first and more important ground, the Court opted to highlight
comity as its favorite jurisdictional term.1 98
For the Court, comity suggests a style of statutory construction for
especially ambiguous statutes (like the FTAIA) that should "avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations."' 99 It
is also a style that assumes "that legislators take account of the legitimate
sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby
helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in
harmony-a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent
commercial world. ' 2°° But the actual harmony or conflict of American and
foreign law is not really what is driving the Court's comity analysis; as Justice
Breyer states, the real work of determining whether a foreign set of antitrust
laws track American antitrust laws is simply "too complex to prove
conduct (1) has a 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on domestic commerce, and (2) 'such
effect gives rise to a [Sherman Act] claim."').
194 See id. at 175.
195 See id. at 169-73.
96 Id. at 169.
197 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 184, at 15.
98 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.")).
1' Id.
2110 Id. at 164-65.
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workable. 2 0 ' Instead, the comity question should be framed in jurisdictional
terms, and not conflict of laws, thus giving rise to the Court's "basic question":
Is it reasonable for American law to apply to foreign plaintiffs that have been
injured by foreign defendants in foreign territory? 20 2  The problem with this,
however, is that the core of the comity idea-that U.S. courts should refrain
from unreasonable interference with foreign interests-is left completely open
due to the Court's unwillingness to actually look at possible conflicts. As a
result, the Court is essentially left with an intuition that it is best to take foreign
governments at their word. After citing arguments from German, Canadian,
and Japanese amicus briefs on how American jurisdiction "would unjustifiably
permit their citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes,
thereby upsetting a balance of competing considerations that their own
domestic antitrust laws embody," the Court determined that the rule of
jurisdictional reason frowned upon the foreign plaintiffs. 20 3
201 Id. at 168. Breyer goes on to ask: "How could a court seriously interested in resolving so empirical a
matter a matter potentially related to impact on foreign interests-do so simply and expeditiously?" Id. at
169.
212 Id. at 166.
201 Id. at 167-69. This note summarizes the primary thrusts of the foreign briefs. Japan:
Giving foreign purchasers the right to damages for purely foreign market transactions
undermines the important principle of comity, respect due to a sovereign nation to regulate
conduct within its national territory. Such an interpretation of the FTAIA has international public
policy implications which would adversely affect the ability of the Government of Japan to
regulate its own economy and govern its own society.
Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hofftnann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 2004 WL 226390 at *2 [hereinafter Brief of Japan]. Canada:
The Government of Canada and Canadian citizens have a particular interest in how principles of
comity and international law that are recognized in both the United States and Canada are
brought to bear on the resolution of this case. Canada has an equally strong interest in the
practical consequences of this Court's decision both because of the interdependence of the
economies of Canada and the United States, which enjoy the largest bilateral trading relationship
in the world, and because of the significant effects the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law is likely to have on the administration of Canada's own competition laws and policies.
Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, F. Hofftnann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), 2004 WL 226389 at *1 [hereinafter Brief for Canada]. Germany and
Belgium:
The court of appeals' decision incorrectly interprets the FTAIA in a manner that will do grave
harm to the antitrust enforcement efforts of the international community. The court's
interpretation drastically expands the extraterritorial reach of the United States' antitrust laws to
situations in which the conduct and the alleged anticompetitive effects suffered by foreign
plaintiffs occur only in foreign countries. Yet, in those situations, other nations have a significant
interest in the transaction and its effects and have jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit that conduct.
The court's holding thus directly conflicts with the well -established principle that United States
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But this was not the end of the story. Although the Court had clearly
decided the hypothetical question of whether a foreign plaintiff suffering
injuries generated by purely foreign effects could find refuge in American
courts (the answer was that comity counseled against such an assertion in the
absence of clear statutory language), 204 the actual question of whether the
Empagran plaintiffs' injuries were independent of anticompetitive effects in
the United States was left open and, consequently, remanded back to the D.C.
Circuit. 205  Thus, while political nausea (in the face of active governmental
interest) and comity were ostensibly doing much of the work in the decision,
the Court also wanted to leave some bread crumbs behind in the name of
functionalism.
On remand, the plaintiffs again asserted their alternate theory that it was
impossible in a global market of fungible vitamin products to separate out the
foreign injuries from the anticompetitive effects in the United States.206  The
court rejected this argument, explaining that while the plaintiffs may not have
suffered their injuries but for the anticompetitive U.S. effects, the comity
principle suggested a more demanding proximate causation test.207  Thus,
because the plaintiffs could not argue that the U.S. effects directly caused their
injuries, and because a but-for test is somehow less congruous with comity, the
court held the plaintiff to be barred from American courts.20 8  Whether this
statutes are to be construed to avoid conflict with other nations' laws and to avoid
unreasonableness in the exercise of U.S. courts' jurisdiction.
Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), 2004 WL 226388 at *4
[hereinafter Brief of Germany and Belgium]. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands also submitted an
amicus brief, presenting a similar argument:
[T]he Governments in general are opposed to assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in private
antitrust cases where foreign claimants seek to recover from foreign defendants solely for foreign
injuries not incurred in the country in which the private suit is filed. Such litigation contravenes
basic principles of international law and may impede trade and investment as well as undermine
public enforcement by the Governments of their competition laws. It also would interfere with a
sovereign nation's right to regulate conduct within its territory.
Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as
Arnici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004),
2004 WL 226597 at *2 [hereinafter Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands].
204 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 156.
215 Id. at 175.
206 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
217 Id. at 1270-71.
208 Id. As Hanno Kaiser has noted, this is an odd result considering that the vitamins case "is probably the
textbook case for dependent effects, a truly global cartel that could never have worked profitably in the rest of
the world without allocating and sustaining higher prices in the U.S. market." Hanno F. Kaiser, Application of
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idea that but-for causation arguments do not adequately capture the comity
analysis will catch on in other circuits, or is a fair reflection of what the
Supreme Court intended with its decision, are questions for the future.2 °9
IV. PRAGMATISM FIGHTS BACK: WHAT ECONOMICS AND EXPERIMENTALISM
MIGHT OFFER EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST
To recap, Empagran involved a worldwide conspiracy among vitamins
manufacturers for price-fixing on their sales to local distributors.21  The facts
of this per se violation of the Sherman Act were not disputed. What was
under scrutiny was whether foreign plaintiffs complaining of injury sustained
outside the territorial borders of the United States could justifiably bring suit in
American courts.2 12 On this point, the Supreme Court eclectically drew on a
comity analysis, reasonableness considerations, and the possibility of an effects
test in order to reach its conclusion: the plaintiffs could not be heard in a U.S.
court unless it could be proved that their injury was in direct connection with
adverse effects to the American vitamins market. 13 Comity served as a tool
for limiting jurisdiction and provided a presumptive argument against
214extraterritorial assertions. The rationale for this presumption was described
pragmatically as a device that provides "a harmony particularly needed in
today's highly interdependent commercial world. ' ,2 15 Harmony, for the Court
as well as the foreign governments that submitted amicus briefs, meant
isolation and the ability for a state to go about setting and following its own
internal rules to the best of its ability.
2 16
The Empagran decision is in step with a line of extraterritoriality cases that
have been pragmatically decided with an eclecticism at once comfortable with
any one of the three primary types of jurisdictional discourse (comity,
U.S. Antitrust Laws to Wholly Foreign Conduct: The Door is Shut. Isn't It, GERMAN AM. TRADIE, Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 26, 29.
209 Since the Supreme Court's decision, lower court holdings have included: Sniado v. Bank Austria AG,
378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004); MM Global Services v. The Dow Chemical Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn.
2004); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, No. Civ.00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790 (D.
Minn. May 2, 2005).
2W F. Hoffnann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
211 id.
212 Id. at 159 60.
213 Id. at 155-56, 164-65, 169.
214 Id. at 169.
215 Id. at 164 65.
216 id.
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reasonableness, and effects) 1. The Empagran Court, after all, based its
decision on all three.
Legal pragmatism, however, is more than just eclecticism, and as the
following discussion shows, it is possible to hear the Empagran facts in the
economic and experimental registers as well. To be clear though, there is
nothing determinative about the economic and experimental modes that would
guarantee a particular outcome in this case. The following views, as a
consequence, are necessarily idiosyncratic. The bottom line, however, which
comes through in the Conclusion, is that these styles, due to their clarity of
purpose and politics, are superior to the eclectic style of pragmatist legal
reasoning.
A. An Economic Pragmatist View
In addition to his well-known role as one of the founders of the law and
economics movement, Richard Posner has taken it upon himself in the last
218decade to make the case for legal pragmatism. Posner's fullest explanation
of the theory of "pragmatic adjudication" is in his book, Law, Pragmatism, and
Democracy, in which he describes it as "a disposition to ground policy
judgments in facts and consequences"-consequences that are not ad hoc but
understood in light of their systemic implications for the legal system.21 9
Posner explains, however, that the focus on systemic consequences should not
be treated as a rule in itself, as this would turn into a kind of formalism with
which his pragmatism, naturally, would find disfavor. 22  Rather, a pragmatic
judge should adopt the "pragmatic mood" that will sometimes find it
advantageous to focus only on the parties before him and on the need to follow
precedent. 22 1 Eschewing formalism as a point of departure, Posner argues that
like the eclectic, formalist decision-making should be one of many tools the
pragmatic judge will have at his disposal. 2 22  Pragmatic adjudication will
211 Id. at 165.
218 Posner's best summation is in LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 35. For an earlier
iteration, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1 (1997). For perspectives
on Posner's pragmatism, see David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twent-Seven Variations on a Theme by
Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1996): William E. Scheuerman, Free-Market Anti-Formalism: The Case qf
Richard Posner, 12 RATIO JURIS 80 (1999); Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be
Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YAEI- L.J. 687 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated
Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 597 (2000).
219 POSNER, supra note 35, at 59.
220 Id. at 59-61.
221 Id. at28,59 61.
222 Id. at 64.
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consequently be spotted with "formalist pockets," which stand for the values in
stability and predictability served by only slowly adjusting the status quo and
the expectations that underlie it.2 23  Furthermore, since judges can hardly be
expected to always take an "all-things-considered" account in decision-
making, they will sometimes have to dispense with moods and rely on rules.
224
This reliance will not be due to any requirement of precedent per se, but will
be attractive because it is the most reasonable course of action in that particular
context. 22  This formalism also takes shape in the form of judicial limits or
boundaries. These limits include the rare times when a dispute will have such
a clear answer that to decide against precedent will have untoward effects on
the legal system and the separation of powers doctrine, which forbids judges
226from deciding questions in ways that exceed their jurisdiction. Even if the
best consequences demand a decision that would override, say, the political
question doctrine, or blatantly flout precedent, the reasonable judge will be
227bound to refrain from making what appears to be the best decision.
Posner's pragmatic method does not end here, however. If it did, it would
be difficult to distinguish from the mode of eclectic pragmatism. Where
eclectics leave reasonableness and policy balancing up to the judge, however,
223 Id. at 60, 65 71.
224 Id. at 64.
225 Id. at 65.
226 Id. at 65-66.
227 Id. Posner has recognized the similarities his program shares with consequentialism and has attempted
to separate the two with reference to his emphasis on the ultimate criterion of reason. Posner says, "If a
consequentialist is someone who believes that an act, such as a judicial decision, should be judged by whether
it produces the best overall consequences, pragmatic adjudication is not consequentialist, at least not
consistently so." Id. at 65. It is hard to see the sense of this. Posner's legal pragmatism can be defined as a
decision-making process whereby the best judicial act will be the one with the most reasonable consequences.
Consequentialists, in contrast, would replace "reasonable" with "best." The consequentialist requires a
normative theory to inform her actions on what will be counted as best and what will not. Id. Best in this
sense does not have any independent meaning exogenous of the normative content provided by her theory of
the good. When Posner distances legal pragmatism from consequentialism because it substitutes what appears
to be the more flexible standard of "reasonable" for "best," he makes the mistake of ignoring the difference
between act- and rule-consequentialism. To be fair, Posner does discuss rule-consequentialism, but he
dismisses it for reasons that are not all together clear. See id. at 49. The account provided thus far has been
one of act-consequentialism, but rule-consequentialism, in contrast, holds that an act will be right to the extent
that it conforms to a particular rule-a rule that is assumed to produce the best consequences when it is
obeyed. SHELLY KACAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 212 (1998). Posner gives examples of pragmatic decisions that
will not have the best consequences in the short run but, due to values in predictability, stability, or separation
of powers, will serve the good in the long term. POSNER, supra note 35, at 65 69. This is precisely the
formulation of rule-consequentialism, in which, for Posner, the rule being served in the long term is the rule of
reason. Id. at 74-75. The set-up is relatively simple: under pragmatic adjudication, a judicial act is the right
one when it has the best consequences, subject to the rule of reason. Id. As rule-consequentialists understand,
however, this form of the theory is no less held hostage to a theory of the good than is act-consequentialism.
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Posner argues that reasonableness determinations should be assisted by the
social sciences: "Pragmatic reasoning is empiricist, and so theories that seek to
,,228guide empirical inquiry are welcomed in pragmatic adjudication .... The
approach to legal problems that best gives content to reasonable decision-
making guided by empirical inquiry, in Posner's view, is law and
economics.229
It is not coincidental that Posner looks to law and economics for help in
unpacking the rule of reason in the pragmatic method. In his reading of the
classic pragmatists, Posner sees a rejection of deductive logic and universal
moral truths, the desire to understand propositions by their consequences and
not by their formal elements (if such things could ever be found), and a
"radical empiricism" that advocated an "extension of the scientific method into
all areas on inquiry., 23 0  This extension opens the door to economic analysis,
but as Posner explains, economics should not become a normative base for
judicial action. 23 1  Thus, economics plays a very large role in the method here,
merging the methods of legal pragmatism and law and economics in a way that
is difficult to distinguish.
232
228 POSNER, supra note 35, at 77.
229 Id. at 78.
23o Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism, 35 METAPHILOSOPHY 147, 148 (2004).
231 Id. at 152. Posner writes:
But economics, and therefore economic analysis of law, come in both formalist and pragmatic
versions, and it is important to distinguish them. In the formalist version, legal decisions are
deemed sound insofar as they conform to a given economic norm, such as Pareto superiority or
wealth maximization. In effect, economic logic is substituted for legal logic, but the structure of
law remains logical. In the pragmatic version of economic analysis of law, economic analysis
identifies the consequences of legal decisions but leaves it up to the judge or other policy maker
to decide how much weight to give to those consequences in the decision-making process.
Economics so understood is an empirical social science, not a body of normative doctrine.
Id. This account seems to draw on Thomas Cotter's review of legal pragmatism's relationship with law and
economics at the prima facie level, there is a genuine collision between legal pragmatism's alleged anti-
foundationalism and the foundational emphasis on wealth maximization over distributional equity in law and
economics. Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071,
2098 (1996). The pragmatist decision-maker that is wedded to a law and economics approach will therefore
be caught up in a series of normative views privileging particular types of criteria-an especially non-
pragmatic approach. If the decision-maker retreats from this type of methodological exclusivity, however, and
maintains Posner's reasonableness as the ultimate criterion, economic approaches can often be useful for
predicting the consequences of certain rules. Id. The bottom line for Cotter is that the law and economics
model, taken alone, is a foundational and non-pragmatic legal theory, but once its user disenchants the
method-understanding its biases and presumptions-the economic approach can assist the pragmatic
decision-maker in her search for predictable results. Id. at 2136-40.
232 Scheuerman, supra note 218, at 86-87.
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By complementing Posner's pragmatism with a law and economics
approach to jurisdictional discourse, we should have an adequate picture of
economic pragmatism: it begins with the consequentialist notion that a
decision should be made that will have the most reasonable effects. 3  In
determining reasonableness,234 the court will first distinguish itself as anti-
foundational (it will not follow rules that have as their basis little more than the
pull of first moral principles such as fairness or justice), contextual (it will not
follow rules that have as their basis little more than the pull of precedent), and
economic (it will argue for the feasibility and usefulness of making
assumptions about how actors characterize their self-interest, as well as the
superiority of cost-benefit analysis in gauging the transactions between such
actors).
233 POSNER, supra note 35, at 74 75.
234 Of course, this type of "reasonableness" determination is very different than the kind typically used in
jurisdiction discourse. For writers like Andreas Lowenfeld and Kingman Brewster, reasonableness does not
depend on philosophical ideas like anti -foundationalism, nor economic assumptions on self-interest and utility-
maximization. See LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 78 80, 230-32; BREWSTER, supra note 127, at 446.
Brewster's list of factors that should influence a reasonableness determination include:
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad: (b) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American consumers or American business opportunity; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on
the United States as compared with those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or
in the case of business associations, their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law
to them; (e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies; and (f) the extent to which
conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the interests of the United States or the
foreign country.
Id. It is not likely that a rational pragmatist like Posner would necessarily believe that this list is
"unreasonable." Rather, the fact that the list is inevitably general and open-ended, and as a result more likely
to produce eclectic results, would conflict with the more empirical demands that Posner places on the
rationality concept.
235 In the opeming page of Posner's Economic Analysis of.Law, he states that [t]he task of economics, so
defined, is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his
satisfactions what we shall call his 'self-interest."' RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3
(1986). Similarly, the first page of Steven Shavell's Foundations qf Economic Analysis of Law states that "the
view taken will generally be that actors are 'rational.' That is, they are forward looking and behave so as to
maximize their expected utility." STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004).
Robert Ellickson likewise explains that this central task "consists of methodological individualism (the
assumption that individuals are the only agents of human action) and the assumption that individuals are self-
regarding and rational." Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAl STUI).
537, 539 (1998). These assumptions on the importance of rationality and self-interest maximization pivot
around "the central norm in law and economics," that of allocative and productive efficiency. Russell Hardin,
Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficienc,, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1987. 1987 (1995). Economic efficiency
obtains when goods in a society are allocated through voluntary exchange into the hands of the people that
value those goods the most. Id. at 1998. The value of a good is therefore a measure of how much a person is
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It is becoming more and more common for economic theory to be applied
236to international legal questions. One recent example is the work of William
Dodge on the economic efficiency of jurisdictional rules.237  Dodge begins his
analysis by categorizing territorial and balancing techniques as "exclusive"
jurisdictional styles, and the effects test as a "concurrent" style.238  The first
two techniques are exclusive because they result in only one state being able to
exercise jurisdiction over the case in question, while the effects test produces
concurrent jurisdiction since it allows for any state that is significantly
impacted to exercise jurisdiction. 239  Arguing against scholars that have
associated the effects test and concurrent jurisdiction with over-regulation, and
240consequently, inefficient jurisdictional allocations, Dodge has explained that
such a social welfare concept erroneously assumes Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
instead of the Pareto principle.24'
willing to pay for it, as this is what rational behavior recommends for social welfare. See POSNER, supra, at
11; SHAVELL, supra, at 1; Hardin, supra, at 1987 98.
236 For an application of economic analysis to the Empagran case, see Klevorick & Sykes, supra note
172, at 361. For general discussions, see Rational Choice and International Law: A Conference Sponsored by
the University qf Chicago Law School, 31 J. LEGAl STUD. S1 (2002); Salil K. Mehra, More is Less: A Law-
and-Economics Approach to the International Scope qf Private Antitrust Enforcement, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 47
(2004); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customarv International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541
(2005): Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. J. INT'L L. 333 (1999): Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analsis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); Joel P.
Trachtman, The International Economni Lawi Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'l EcoN. L. 33 (1996); Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8, 27 (2005).
237 William S. Dodge, An Economic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27
(2003).
238 Id. at 28. Dodge notes that in conflict of laws, this distinction is more generally used in terms of
unilateralism and multilateralism. Dodge, supra note 40, at 104.
239 Dodge, supra note 237, at 28.
240 Id. (citing Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. LJ 883 (2002): Andrew
T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible.", 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1510-21 (1998)).
241 Id. at 35 36. One problem that has long attended economic theory involves how to adequately
compare the utility that one person experiences against the utility of another, in terms of their relative degrees
of happiness. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487. 488 (1980). On the battle's frontier was Vilfredo Pareto, who
developed an efficiency concept predicated on the value an item would garner as it moved through the market:
Pareto efficiency became a theoretical model that claimed scenario A to be superior to scenario B when no one
in B loses anything by moving to A, and at least one person has gained. Id. at 488. As Posner has admitted,
however, Pareto efficiency is often too demanding a criterion for economic analysis of law because of the
impact transactions necessarily have on third parties. Id. at 489. Consequently, the more widely-used criterion
is the Kaldor-Hicks concept, sometimes called "Potential Pareto Superiority," which holds that an outcome
will be efficient when the winners in a transaction are capable of compensating the loser such that no actors are
worse off. Id. at 491. The big caveat in Kaldor-Hicks is that the winners, while they should be capable of
compensating the losers, are not obligated to do so. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES
83-85 (1978): Posner, supra, at 491.
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The idea here is that the gains associated with jurisdictional exercise are
outweighed by the costs of too many states flexing their muscles at the same
242time. The effects test, which promotes such a waste, is therefore inefficient
from a global welfare perspective that defines welfare as a state in which the
total social costs of performance are less than its value. Once the costs
outweigh the value of jurisdictional exercise, there is an inefficient allocation
of global resources. Dodge's response is that this perspective fails first, by the
fact that exclusive jurisdictional techniques tend to under-regulate and second,
because the efficiency definition in question is blind to distributional
concerns-concerns that the Pareto principle, but not Kaldor-Hicks, is meant
to take into account. 243 For Dodge, this distinction makes a difference in the
international realm because the distributional effects that follow Kaldor-Hicks
policy decisions in the national context are offset by tax-and-transfer244
programst. At the international level, no such offsets exist that might
245discipline distributional effects. Consequently, total social costs are optimal
when jurisdictional resources are spent in the presence of anticompetitive
domestic effects, since the efficiency measure in play is one in which a
situation is superior when at least some parties are better off, and none are
worse off.
246
Joel Trachtman's work provides another example of economic analysis ofjuridiciona "' 247
jurisdictional discourse. His argument begins with an analogy between
individual property rights and states' rights to exercise jurisdiction, where one
aspect of a property regime is to structure rights such that they best minimize
248
externalities. Analogously, a "primary function of jurisdictional rules is
similarly that of shaping governmental incentives to achieve a greater
internalization of externalities among political units.' 249 Jurisdiction will be at
its most efficient, therefore, when its exercise has the least impact on third
parties. This does not mean, however, that Trachtman comes out against an
242 Dodge, supra note 237, at 30-31.
243 Id. at 32 38.
244 Id. at 37.
245 id.
246 Id. at 36 38.
247 Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'l L. 2, 3-4 (2001).
See generally MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2000): Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice qfLaw, 67 U. CHI L. REV.
1151 (2000).
248 Trachtman, supra note 247, at 6 7.
249 Id. at 6-7.
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effects test, though he does not take it as an unqualified good either.250 For
Trachtman, the total social welfare is maximized, in the context of
jurisdictional discourse, when the gains from intergovernmental transactions in
prescriptive jurisdiction are greater than the sum of costs borne by third parties
and intergovernmental transactions. 2 5 In the property context, this would
track as a measure of social welfare when the gains associated with the use and
transfer of property rights were greater than the losses felt by third parties and
transaction costs.
2 52
Trachtman's analysis, while it does bring to bear this rationally formulated
cost-benefit strategy on jurisdictional questions, is basically pragmatic in its
house-cleaning ambition: "this article debunks simplistic responses to the
prescriptive jurisdiction and choice of law problem both from more traditional
,,253perspectives, and from law and economics. For example, Trachtman
argues against fetishizing the benefits associated with "clear rules," a
jurisdictional regime that gravitates toward the most substantively efficient
laws in any particular state, and presumptions against extraterritoriality, or
anything else for that matter. 4  To be sure, Trachtman's analysis is
mainstream inasmuch as it does not do away with all the usual benefits.
250 Id. at 7.
251 Trachtman, supra note 247, at 8-9. Trachtman writes:
The underlying assumption of this article is rationalist: that states use and design international
institutions, including regimes for prescriptive jurisdiction and choice of law, to maximize the
members' net gains (NG), which equals the excess of transaction gains from engaging in
intergovernmental transactions in prescriptive jurisdiction (TG), over the sum of transaction
losses (such as loss of autonomy) from engaging in intergovernmental transactions (TL), and
transaction costs of intergovernmental transactions (including those occasioned by strategic and
information asymmetry problems, TC).
Id. at 8 9 (emphasis omitted).
252 Id. at I 1-14.
253 Id. at 10. Trachtman includes a hit-list:
As to more traditional perspectives, for example, this article shows the weakness of broad
assertions (i) that the effects test is improper, (ii) that rules of prescriptive jurisdiction should
always be clear, (iii) that courts should exercise little discretion in determining prescriptive
jurisdiction, (iv) that unilateralism and multilateralism cannot coexist, (v) that there should be a
presumption against "extraterritoriality," and (vi) that in cases of "true conflicts," forum courts
should simply apply their own law. As to law and economics-based analyses, this article refutes
the arguments (i) that jurisdiction should generally be allocated in accordance with "regulatory
competence," (ii) that private choice should generally be determinative of governing law, (iii)
that clear rules of prescriptive jurisdiction are best, and even (iv) that the most efficient law
should govern.
Id. at 10-11.
254 Id.
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Examples of these advantages include: the idea that because property rights
will move to those who value them the most, the states that deem jurisdictional
exercise to be most valuable should have it; the recognition of territoriality as a
"touchstone" of prescriptive jurisdiction; 255 and that "all other things being
equal, the state with the greatest absolute advantage in regulation should be
allocated prescriptive jurisdiction." 256
Taking this baseline as our cue, an analysis of Empagran from the point of
view of the economic pragmatist has three parts. The first part asks what
consequences would follow from a reading of the FTAIA to allow for the
plaintiffs to bring their claims in U.S. courts. The second asks how reasonable
such policy considerations appear in light of the current context. The third
asks how economic analysis might assist in such a reasonableness
determination.
1. Policy Analysis
Due to the ambiguous state of the FTAIA, the first issue to be resolved is
whether there are meaningful policy arguments for allowing plaintiffs to be
heard in American courts. In particular, this discussion looks to the
consequences of such an allowance, and whether it could cause turbulence
among U.S. actors as well as members of the international community in terms
of settled expectations on where and how antitrust remedies are made available
in various jurisdictions. As made clear in the amicus briefs offered by the
governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany,
Canada, and Japan, turbulence would be a big problem. 257  For these
governments, the trouble is located in two basic areas: forum-shopping and
sovereign prerogative.
25 8
The forum-shopping argument, as made in the brief for the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, is something like this.259  The United States
255 Id. at 44.
256 Id. at 77 78.
257 Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203, at 7-8: Brief of Germany and Belgium, supra
note 203, at 7 8; Brief for Canada, supra note 203, at 17 21; Brief of Japan, supra note 203, at 8 11.
258 Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203, at 6; Brief of Germany and Belgium, supra note
203, at 4-6, 14-15: Brief for Canada, supra note 203, at 14-15: Brief of Japan, supra note 203, at 9.
259 The following language is especially pertinent to this argument:
This decision would provide substantial encouragement for widespread forum shopping, might
impede competition law enforcement programs in the United Kingdom, Ireland and the
Netherlands as well as the European Community, and would undermine respect for national
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antitrust regime is the only one in the world that has adopted a "bounty hunter"
approach that allows private plaintiffs to recover treble damages.260
Consequently, the U.S. rules favorable to private plaintiffs and which are
foreign to the known world will, when enlarged through a process of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, evoke an international flight to U.S. courts. 261
Quoting Lord Denning in their brief, the governments argue, "As a moth is
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get
his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. ' 262 The prospects for this
kind of forum-shopping would cause problems both for foreign governments,
as well as the United States itself. On the foreign side, there is the worry that
as plaintiffs are attracted to U.S. courts, domestic policies geared towards
263immunity for whistle-blowers will be undermined. In the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and the Netherlands, leniency programs allow for the first member of a
264
cartel to come forward in order to avoid criminal persecution. This
immunity, however, does not apply to civil actions, and so to the extent that
forum-shopping is more likely, there will be less incentive for cartel members
to come forward and expose themselves to civil liability.265  As for U.S.
interests, there will be an obvious jump in the number of litigants coming to
U.S. courts, 266 thus posing a severe problem of judicial economy.
The other major problem with this interpretation of the FTAIA allowing for
any claim under the Sherman Act to get a plaintiff into U.S. courts, as
explained in the Empagran decision, is that such an action would violate the
267comity principle in international law. The policy implications of such a
move, also as described in the amici briefs, would be to destabilize an
sovereignty. The court of appeals' ruling has the potential for generating needless friction
between foreign and United States legal systems and could lead to less, not more, cooperation
and coordination of competition laws by all nations. It would wrongly expand the extraterritorial
reach of the United States antitrust laws beyond this Court's or, to our knowledge, any foreign
court's exercise of jurisdiction. International law principles recognize that a nation may
prescribe laws and adjudicate claims beyond its own territory only where its assertion of
jurisdiction does not infringe the rights of other nations to determine the law applicable to
conduct within their own territories.
Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203, at 6.
260 Id. at 13.
261 id.
262 Id. at 14 (quoting Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, I W.L.R. 730, 737 (C.A. 1982)).
263 Id. at 12-13.
264 Id. at 11.
265 Id. at 12-13.
266 Id. at 14.
267 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
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assumption common to the international community, namely, the right of a
state to govern its nationals and territory in accordance with its own norms and
customs. 2 68 An expansion of U.S. extraterritoriality would threaten the pattern
of interdependence upon which the international community is predicated.269
Ultimately, settled expectations on the part of foreign governments would
come under serious pressure as to whether the U.S. policy of extraterritoriality
over matters of private international law was still party to that central, if
unspoken, contract.
At the same time, of course, policy arguments are marshaled in favor of
extraterritorial exercise as well, including the notion that a narrow effects-test
270interpretation of the FTAIA could lead to under-regulation. Borrowing from
the Supreme Court's Pfizer decision, Ralf Michaels, Hannah Buxbaum, and
Horatia Muir Watt recall:
If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in this country and
abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies
affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal
profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to
plaintiffs at home. If, on the other hand, potential antitrust violators
must take into account the full costs of their conduct, American
consumers are benefited by the maximum deterrent effect of treble
damages upon all potential violators.
27 1
This argument has more or less currency as a matter of how many jurisdictions
are able to claim and sustain comparable antitrust regimes. Because many
developing countries have enforcement regimes that take different views on
the topic of market regulation, U.S. notions of market regulation would be
jeopardized. 27 2  Michaels, Buxbaum, and Watt do not go on to conclude,
however, that the prospects of under-regulation necessitate U.S.
extraterritoriality. Rather, the way forward first demands a consideration of
268 Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203, at 18 19. But see Brief of Arnici Curiae Law
Professors Ralf Michaels, Hannah Buxbaum and Horatia Muir Watt in Support of Respondents at 9-10, F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter Brief in Support of
Respondents] (arguing that allowing private actions brought by plaintiffs for foreign conduct that has a
substantial effect in the United States would not be inconsistent with international norms).
269 Brief for Canada, supra note 203, 17-23.
270 Brief in Support of Respondents, supra note 268, at 14.
271 Id. (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978)).
272 Brief in Support of Respondents, supra note 268, at 14-16.
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judicial restraint in the face of reasonableness and comity, thus bringing the
273
analysis full circle.
2. Reasonableness
For the economic pragmatist, it would be important to begin the analysis
with something like this rough canvass of the relevant policy considerations
and the consequences such considerations would have on the stability and
propriety of the legal system and American interests. The answer, however, is
not for the judge to simply choose the "best" conclusion and end it there.
Rather, the judge must find the most reasonable solution, though the
reasonableness determination is not synonymous with the one spelled out in
the Restatement. To be sure, an economic pragmatist judge need not ignore
the Restatement; after all, in her survey of the relevant policy considerations
the judge will look to a great many, if not all, of the Restatement's factors.
Links between the conduct and the territory, the nature of the conduct and the
nationality of the actor, the likelihood of conflicts, and the stability of the
international system will all be on the table. 274 For the economic pragmatist,
the question of whether it is reasonable to allow the doors of U.S. courts to
open for plaintiffs like those in Empagran also would be subject to economic
analysis.
3. The Turn to Economic Analysis
As it stands, there seems little in the way of a clear point of decision in the
clash between the policy problems of forum-shopping and the erosion of
national sovereignty, on the one hand, and on the other, the upkeep of a
particular ideological view of the market that demands a degree of regulation
best kept from the unreliable hands of nascent antitrust regimes in the
developing world. How should the judge decide in this policy debate?
Perhaps, as the Court did in Empagran, the judge will be able to intuit a
particular argument as the most reasonable and command a course of action
entailing a special deference to the comity principle, and as a consequence, to
the foreign amicus briefs.275 Just as likely, however, an economic pragmatist
judge would not settle so easily on what appears to be a rather arbitrary move,
and look instead for help. As discussed above, Dodge and Trachtman both
273 Id. at 2-3.
274 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
275 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004).
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offer particular routes out of what might be an especially uncomfortablejudicil "' 276
judicial predicament. Fortuitously, an economic pragmatist's decision
leaves the ambiguous realm of reasonableness and enters the more precise
domain of efficiency.
If our economic pragmatist judge turned to Dodge for an economic analysis
of jurisdictional discourse, she would likely receive some type of advice
favoring a decision for the plaintiffs. As will be recalled, Dodge argues in
favor of concurrent jurisdictional schemes where possible.277 A concurrent
scheme would be one in which each jurisdiction that has been able to erect an
argument with respect to felt effects would be able to justifiably adjudicate the
278
conduct in its courts. Of course, the rationale here has little directly to do
with a sovereignty claim; rather the issue turns on an argument made by
Michaels, Buxbaum, and Watts concerning the relationship between
"exclusive" jurisdictional schemes and the specter of under-regulation.279 For
some, as Dodge argues, a concurrent scheme is problematic in that it will be
inefficient due to an excessive degree of over-regulation. 28  As the foreign
amicus briefs argue, for example, firms will not only be less willing to
cooperate in national enforcement programs, but in the face of panoramic
plaintiffs' claims, business will also experience a chilling effect.
281
A ready reply at this point would be to say that a mistake has been made,
and that an argument for a concurrent jurisdiction scheme is misapplied in the
Empagran context. After all, the point of the litigation was not to establish the
legitimacy of the effects test. The question was whether a foreign plaintiff
injured by a foreign defendant on foreign soil could file a claim in a U.S.
court.282 As the Empagran court explained, the door was left ajar for the
plaintiffs if they could in fact show that their injury was not independent of
283domestic connection. The economic pragmatist may reply, at least in the
vein of Dodge or Buxbaum, that it is correct to say that the issue is not whether
276 See supra notes 237 56 and accompanying text.
277 Dodge, supra note 237, at 28.
278 id.
279 Brief in Support of Respondents, supra note 268, at 14.
28o Dodge, supra note 237, at 28.
281 See Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203, at 12-13; Brief of Germany and Belgium,
supra note 203, at 10-15: Brief for Canada, supra note 203, at 13-15: Brief of Japan, supra note 203, at 9.
282 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
283 Id. at 165-68 (2004).
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the effects test is legitimate. The problem is how to understand "effects. 284 If
effects are understood not as the "transactions" that occur between the relevant
parties but instead as the anti-competitive conduct itself-in this case a
worldwide price-fixing scheme-a particular state will want to adjudicate that
conduct even when it has not been a direct target of the conspiracy:
If the vitamins cartel had been directed solely at the U.S. market,
U.S. market participants would have been able to acquire vitamins
from other markets at lower prices. A global cartel is effective only
if it covers all, or at least all significant, markets. As a consequence,
a country detrimentally affected by the cartel has an interest in
regulating that cartel globally.285
With this more nuanced understanding of "effects," the economic
pragmatist asks whether concurrent jurisdiction is nonetheless inefficient as a
matter of wasting global resources. For Dodge, the answer would be that it is
not a waste because an efficiency concept that assumed individual states to be
working on a Kaldor-Hicks model inappropriately assumes the existence of a
286
supra-national political authority able to adjust for distributional problems.
Since no such authority exists, and since individual states cannot be expected
to take social welfare perspectives into account in their jurisdictional decision-
making, regulatory benefits will be higher than the costs when states
concurrently exercise their jurisdictional powers. For Trachtman, who has a
more complicated view of the benefits associated with an effects test, the
jurisdictional question would be a bit tougher. 287 In Trachtman's analysis, the
efficient holding would be the one less concerned with distributional outcomes
as much as it properly balanced the wide array of externalities attending the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over the plaintiffs.2 88
4. Conclusion
For the economic pragmatist, the conclusion could cut in a couple of
different ways. For some judges of this stripe, the interest in stability and the
maintenance of a historicist jurisdictional design might preclude the analysis
284 Brief in Support of Respondents, supra note 268, at II ("What remains disputed is the proper content
of the effects doctrine. As the court below correctly observed, the relevant activity for purposes of the effects
doctrine is the conduct of the cartel in fixing prices, not the individual market transactions in which petitioners
suffered resulting overcharges.").
285 Id. at 12.
286 Dodge, supra note 237, at 35-36.
287 Trachtman, supra note 247, at 34-41.
281 Id. at 34-35.
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from ever reaching the stage of economic analysis. In all likelihood, the threat
of exploding the U.S. legal system with a frenzy of forum-shoppers would be,
to say the least, a bit of a worry for the economic pragmatist. After all, Posner
nowhere says that this style of adjudication requires a descent into economic
analysis; it is only something to turn to when a decision on reasonableness is in
need of assistance (although it must be said that Posner thinks that economics
will quite often be helpful).289 To be sure, the Empagran facts may indeed
bring a pragmatist to just such an impasse. Considering the relevant policy
considerations of an ambiguous statute and a murky pedigree in international
law, the pragmatist judge could justifiably-on Posner's view-make the
transition from reasonableness to efficiency and enter the debate among
scholars like Dodge, Trachtman, and Buxbaum. Whatever the case may be, it
hardly seems correct to argue that, insofar as a holding on the Empagran facts
might go, economic pragmatism would admit a single view. It also seems
highly likely that the economic pragmatist, unlike the eclectic, would not tear
off in the direction of comity analysis frightened by the increasingly political
nature of the jurisdictional question. Clearly, there are significant signposts for
the judge along the way-interests in consequences, reasonableness, stability,
and efficiency-which will greatly limit the possible routes to conclusion. But
whether that would mean a concurrence with the majority's eclecticism, or a
dissent in favor of concurrent jurisdiction, is impossible to say.
B. An Experimental Pragmatist View
Thus far we have seen that eclectic pragmatists view themselves as
apolitical-they share little more than a general orientation against formalism
and foundations and a penchant for slow, steady changes (if any) in the legal
fabric. 290 The second group, that of the economic pragmatists, aspires on its
face to the same type of freestanding, apolitical relationship with the law.
291
On examination, however, the tight relationship between economic theory and
pragmatism becomes clear, revealing a particularly normative decision-making
procedure.
29 2
289 Posner, supra note 230, at 152.
290 Grey, Freestanding, supra note 59, at 21-22.
291 POSNER, supra note 35, at 59 60.
292 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 599-604.
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This third category of legal pragmatists, which I hitch to the term
"experimental," is quite different. 293  First, it makes no mistake about the
distinction between personal philosophy and public politics: it is flatly
294rejected. Where Rorty, Grey, and Posner (in a failed attempt) argue for a
separation of pragmatist philosophy from the world of law and politics,
experimental pragmatists instead draw on Dewey's reconstructive philosophy,
and more recently, Roberto Unger's democratic experimentalism. 29 5 In order
to get a sense for what this means for experimentalists, consider Menand's
view that pragmatism provides a person with "the sense that a pressing but
vaguely understood obligation has suddenly been lifted from their
,296
shoulders." One imagines a sweeping, swooning feeling where the newly-
baptized pragmatist who had once seen life as a constrained set of choices and
dogmas is now opened up to the limitless vistas in his possible alternative
293 The primary texts used in this article are Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1019 21; William H.
Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 127, 174 75 (2004); and Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofjDemocratic
Experimentalism, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998). Much of the literature that constitutes the experimental
approach has a critical lineage and goes under the name of some or another anti-status-quo nom de guerre. In
an article surveying this literature, Orly Lobel lists a number of the labels: "reflexive law," collaborative
governance, "democratic experimentalism," "responsive regulation," "outsourcing regulation,"
"reconstitutive law," "post-regulatory law," revitalizing regulation," "regulatory pluralism," decentering
regulation," "meta-regulation," "contractarian law," "communicative governance," "negotiated governance,"
"destabilization rights," "cooperative implementation," "interactive compliance," "public laboratories,"
"deepened democracy and empowered participatory governance," "pragmatic lawyering," "nonrival
partnership," and "a daring legal system." Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall qf Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 346-47 (2004). Among the citations
she includes are: IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGUI ATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2002): Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems q Labor Standards
and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003). For other representatives of the experimental approach, see
Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC SOCIOILOGY 138 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VANt. L. REV. 829, 831, 852
(2000): Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. I 33-40
(1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Infirmation as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Perfionance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm9 , 89 GEO. L.J. 257. 259-63 (2001); James S. Liebman &
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance
and Legal Refibrm, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 266 68, 278 83 (2002); Joanne Scott & David M.
Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 E R. L.J. I, 8-15
(2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 479-91 (2001); Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in
Transition, 29 Am. J. L. & MED. 395, 418 21 (2003).
294 Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 293. at 388-95.
295 See generally JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (1948); ROBERTO UNGER, DEMOCRACY
REALIZED: THE PRO(RESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998); ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS: THE CENTRAL TEXTS (1997).
296 MENAND, supra note 56, at xi.
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futures. The experimental pragmatist takes this excitement, pulls it from the
private space, pushes it into the public, and arrives, quite dramatically, in the
world of an unbound pragmatism which contributes, in Unger's words, to a
person's "raising up to godlike power and freedom-and the deepening of
democracy-that is to say, the creation of forms of social life that recognize
and nourish the godlike powers of ordinary humanity, however bound by
. - . • ,,297
decaying bodies and social chains. At least, that is the idea.
The significance for legal pragmatism when the public-private distinction is
relaxed can, quite apparently, be substantial. The persistence of the distinction
enables eclectic pragmatism in its characterization of public discourse as
.. 298
immune from the destabilizing effects of philosophical deconstruction.
Once the private-public partition is lowered, these effects spill into the public
realm. This is the maneuver of experimental pragmatists, who argue for the
application of pragmatic rejuvenation to the public mind, just as philosophers
have favored it in the contexts of truth-seeking and belief formation for private
individuals.
299
For William Simon, a representative of the experimental strain, legal
pragmatism has a number of ingredients. First is a perspective that emphasizes
the responsibilities of citizens to take active and deliberative roles in
participatory government. 30 Immediately, we can see how this version moves
away from Rorty's public-private distinction, pushing pragmatic reform into
the levers of governance. 30 1  Second, this reliance on individual initiative
moves legal pragmatism away from dependence on the judiciary and toward
involvement in civic associations and non-governmental organizations. 3 02 This
kind of strategy is conducive to a third ingredient, which is governance that it
is decentralized, flexible, and open to rolling rule regimes.3 03 Fourth, legal
pragmatism is consequentialist such that solutions take priority over rights-
claims; in contrast to the other legal pragmatisms, experimentalism does not
have "formalist pockets. ' 3°4  To some degree, this factor is based on the
pragmatic argument against foundations and first principles; i.e., if we cannot
297 UNGER, supra note 47, at 28.
298 Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 590-91.
299 Id. at 612.
300 Simon, supra note 293, at 175.
301 id.
302 id.
303 id.
304 POSNER, supra note 35, at 60 (discussing the presence of "formalist pockets" in a pragmatic system of
adjudication); see also Simon, supra note 293, at 177-78.
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accept as a deontological rule the morality of individual rights, why should
• 05
they have a trumping power over other forms of problem-solving? 3  Simon's
account provides a second way of differentiating experimentalists from the
eclectic and economic versions of legal pragmatism: the method is more than a
preoccupation with context, consequence, and adjudication; it is interested in
new governance strategies, public deliberation, and the experimentalism
inherent in a destruction of the means-end dualism.
30 6
A second distinguishing characteristic of the experimentalists is the
normative underpinning, which generates the move to ignore the public-private
distinction in the first place. 307 That is, it is not an arbitrary move to say, as
experimentalists do, that the philosophical power of the pragmatist method
should be transposed onto public discourse.308  The motivation appears to be
rooted in a basic disposition lacking among eclectics and economists: a
disposition toward reform.309  Experimentalists are discontent with liberal
social arrangements and the attendant distributional effects in a way that the
other camps are not: they see something wrong with the world and they want
to fix it.
310
The experimental method, as explained by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel,
relies on two key premises. First, democratic "governance," and not
adjudication, is the key interest. 31 That is, experimentalists take a more
holistic view of legal pragmatism and its scope, emphasizing the disability of
courts to maintain their gate-keeping functions in what is a crisis of
governance facing the entire constitutional system in the United States.312 For
the promise of democracy to be realized, pragmatism must reach well beyond
the judiciary. Latent in this first assumption is the second: there is a
305 Simon, supra note 293, at 178 79. Simon writes:
[The Pragmatist] assumes, first, that any given set of issues is likely to involve shared as well as
conflicting interests and values, and second, that it is often a mistake to try to determine in
advance of the dispute resolution process which type of values and interests
predominate .... Thus, Pragmatism declines to single out a particular category of interests as
categorical of interests as categorical or trump-like.
ld. at 179.
306 Simon, supra note 293, at 127, 181-98: see also John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORN-II
L. Q. 17, 19 (1924).
307 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 590-91.
38 Id. at 613.
309 id.
310 id.
311 See Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 293, at 270 72, 293.
312 Id. at 270.
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governance crisis that is badly in need of attention. 313 By highlighting the rise
of the fourth arm of government (the administrative state) and criticisms on the
degree to which the realities of democratic life actually track its foundational
principles (separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights),314 Dorf and
Sabel make it clear that theirs is a reformist agenda.3 15
As for the method itself, it draws on an analogy to the private firm, where
innovations in the marketplace
suggest institutional devices for applying the basic principles of
pragmatism to the master problem of organizing decentralized,
collaborative design and development under conditions of volatility
and diversity .... To determine what to make and how, firms in this
new economy must therefore resort to a collaborative exploration of
disruptive possibilities that has more in common with praratist
ideas of social inquiry than familiar ideas of market exchange.
Dorf and Sabel apply these ideas to governmental action at the local level and
argue that since problem-solving is inevitably at its most potent and relevant at
the local level, it is essential that the products of local governance initiatives be
broadcast through information-pooling techniques. 317 That is, regional and
federal institutions are necessary to insure the availability of inter-local cross-
linking, such that the fruits of deliberative call-and-response might enable
localities to learn from one another's successes and failures. 318 The result of
such an increase in deliberation and local initiative would have two structural
effects-the "privatization" on the one hand of opening up governance strategy
to the innovative style of a public marketplace, and on the other hand the "re-
politicization" of our democratic institutions through the introduction of "a
novel form of deliberation based on the diversity of practical activity, not the
dispassionate homogeneity of those insulated from everyday experience.
319
Together, it is argued, these effects will restructure American democracy in a
way that will at once track the traditional interests in republican government
and the evolving demands of the administrative state.
320
313 Id.
314 id.
315 See id.
316 Id. at 286.
317 Id. at 287-88.
318 id.
319 Id. at 313 14.
320 id.
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Despite the experimentalist emphasis on the legislative responsibility to
ensure deliberative fora and local participation, 32' there remains a role for
courts to play. One of the fundamental problems identified by Dorf and Sabel
is the incapacity of courts to justifiably maneuver through political
questions.3 22 When the courts defer to the legislature, it is often the case that
such deference is inappropriate, due to a lack of legislative intent regarding the
relationship between the means employed and the ends sought by the statute.
323
At the same time, when courts intervene and displace congressional will, it
typically represents an assertion of balancing techniques that betray little more
than the courts' preferences for particular ends.3 24 The common problem here,
according to Dorf and Sabel, is an indeterminate relation between means and
ends-an indeterminacy that inevitably leads courts either to the extremes of
deference or ad hoc value judgment. 32 5  Of course, eclectic and economic
pragmatists know this just as well as the experimentalists do. The key
difference here is that, while the former simply make do, whether in bad faith
or not, experimentalists are not willing to play along. Their way out is for the
court to adopt, along with the other branches of government, a program of
democratic experimentalism.
326
In its holistic view of democratic governance, experimentalism posits a role
for the judiciary that avoids the indeterminacy dilemma by shifting much of
the work away from courts and into the hands of agencies and private
parties. 32 7 In an environmental law context, Dorf and Sabel illustrate how this
328
can work. In adjudicating a dispute over the reasonableness of the Reagan
Administration's interpretation of "stationary source" as treating all emissions
from a plant as a single source, the Supreme Court deferred to the agency
definition in light of the statute's ambiguous language. 32 9 An experimentalist
court would not have been faced with this sort of Hobson's choice-defer or
330balance. Instead, various localities would be empowered with what was
321 Id. at 318.
322 Id. at 390-91.
323 Id. at 391 95.
324 Id. Duncan Kennedy writes, "in contemporary legal theory, policy is always a potential Trojan horse
for ideology, just because of the patently weak rationality of choosing policies by universalizability and then
merely 'balancing' them." Kennedy, supra note 34, at 1076.
325 Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution qfDemocratic Experimentalism, supra note 293, at 390-95.
326 Id. at 395.
327 Id. at 442.
328 Id. at 395-98.
329 Id. at 395 96.
131 Id. at 393, 395-96.
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known as the "bubble" approach to the statute, and after enough time had
elapsed and enough information had been gathered, parties could offer reasons
as to why bubble approaches were superior or inferior to the traditional reading
of "stationary source." 331 Of course, this adjudicative style would be greatly
assisted by an experimentalist statute that allowed for such an approach. But
even in the absence of such legislation, Dorf and Sabel argue for
experimentalist judgment that takes as its baseline the need for parties to
define the range of alternatives to be considered in an evaluation of
the appropriateness of ends to means, further publicizing the variety
of possibilities in the process; and in deciding whether due
consideration has been given to these alternatives, the court refers to
standards of care and attentiveness-the ability to learn and learn to
learn-that emerge from the practice of the relevant parties
themselves.
332
In terms of its substance, experimentalist judgment focuses on the deliberative
responsibility of the parties, as well as the care-taking of fundamental legal
norms. 333 Procedurally, its focus is on participation and the degree to which
parties have referenced best practices in other jurisdictions.334
Experimental pragmatism is like eclectic pragmatism, and unlike economic
pragmatism, in that there does not appear to be a basic normative foundation
335that steers pragmatic decision-making. Where eclectics pick and choose as
the situation demands, experimentalists, in contrast, maintain a more rigorous
orientation in favor of the "new" and the "different." 336 There is, after all, a
program here: (1) experiment locally, (2) adopt provisional goals, (3) pool
331 Id. at 396.
332 Id. at 401.
131 Id. at 403.
334 id.
335 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 611-17 (discussing experimental pragmatism and Ungerian
pragmatism).
336 For example, Siegfried Schieder writes:
It has also been objected that the creative act itself is being declared the highest trading value. A
pragmatist legal theory would indeed be too narrowly cast as long as it took as its theme only the
production of new solutions to problems and not also the new criteria for evaluating them.
Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path Towards a Discursive and Open Theory of International Law, II
E R. J. INT'I, L. 663, 689 (2000).
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information across jurisdictions, and (4) repeat. 337 Experimentalism therefore
places a premium on locality, reform, and multi-jurisdictional dialectics. 338
The experimental pragmatist would take a rather different route in what
would likely be a dissent to, and not a concurrence with, the Empagran
opinion. As a matter of general disposition, the experimentalist, in contrast
with both the eclectic and the economic pragmatist, will tend to destabilize the
judicial discourse when such an opportunity exists. 339  Here, the harvest is
bountiful; few clear limits stand in the way of the court to experiment with the
way judges talk to each other about jurisdictional questions, considering the
vacuous state of the FTAIA.
1. Globalization, Deliberation, Experimentalism
Before articulating an experimental view of extraterritorial antitrust, it will
first be helpful to briefly mention an attitude with respect to deliberation at the
international level that might be attractive to experimental pragmatists. James
Bohman has argued, along with scholars like Jdrgen Habermas and Seyla
Benhabib, that the persistence of global interdependence and democratic
deficits require new discursive processes to be elaborated in the global public
sphere. 34  Bohman envisions this sphere as a highly politicized space where
"world citizens"
debate, discuss, and deliberate in such a way as to produce public
agreements that would be acceptable from "the point of view of
everyone" affected by decisions made within any legitimate political
institutions. They must produce "pluralistic consensus" or plural
agreements of the sort that would be consistent with the integrity of
337 See generally Dorf & Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 293
(discussing experimental pragmatism).
338 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 611 12.
339 Sabel and Simon write:
Destabilization usefully describes both the remedy and the process by which the meaning of the
background substantive right is articulated in these cases. In the new public law, the judge does
not exercise discretion in each case to choose among an infinite array of potential responses to
the particular problem. Rather, having found a violation of some broad norm-the right to an
adequate education, the right to access to justice she imposes the single remedy that the liability
phase has shown to be appropriate: institutional destabilization.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1056.
340 James Bohman, The Globali ation of the Public Sphere, 75 MODERN SCHOOIMAN 101 (Jan. 1998).
See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAI, CONSTEIILATION (Max Pensky ed., trans., MIT Press
2001) (1998); SEYLA BENHABtB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA
(2002).
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various political communities, cultures, and forms of life which the
institutions of federalism not only permit but also seem to foster.
341
Bohman believes that in such a vital and vigorous domain lies the
transformative potential for the elaboration of new democratic institutions.
342
This first depends, however, on the existence of robust civil society not only at
the international level, but within nations as well. 43 Ideally, citizens in civil
society have the opportunity to articulate experimental forms and deliberate on
political disagreements. Bolstered by these discourses, Bohman suggests that
citizens take their arguments to the cosmopolitan sphere, effecting change in
boomerang style back on the level of nation-states. 344 For Bohman, as well as
other writers of this stripe, the European Union (EU) provides a good template
for such a renewed deliberative field.345  Contemporary international
institutions are not up to the task because they improperly discount the
interests of citizens for the benefit of states and their representatives, making
them, as a result, only minimally democratic. 346 In the EU, however,
it is possible to see how a cosmopolitan public can begin to be
organized by, and in turn reorganize, a deliberative institution.
International civil society is not enough; it is too punctual and too
divided spatially and temporally to effect decisions. Only the
cosmopolitan public sphere can become the location for the public
use of reason by international civil society.
347
With this international orientation in the background, this idiosyncratic
version of an experimentalist dissent will follow three steps: an interrogation of
the comity analysis so hard at work in Empagran; a push toward deliberation
(among governments, firms, and judges) and information pooling; and the
instantiation of a rolling rule regime.
341 James Bohman, The Public Spheres qf World Citi ens, in PERPETUAl PEACE 187 (James Bohman &
Matthias Lutz-Bachmari eds., 1997).
342 id.
343 id.
344 Id. at 192 93.
341 Id. at 195.
346 id.
347 Id. at 195-96. Sabel, Simon, and Joshua Cohen cover related territory in their work on the EU and the
"global democracy." See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without
Sovereignty, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAISM IN THE EU AND THE US 395 (Grainne de Burca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'i L. &
POL. 763 (2005); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Diffrence: The New Architecture o1
Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 E R. L.J. 271 (May 2008).
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2. Comity Recast
The Empagran Court's interpretation of the FTAIA was heavily influenced
by its comity analysis, such that the claim under the Sherman Act, required by
§ 6, should be dependent on domestic anticompetitive harms. 348  An
experimental point of departure would be to take a different look at the comity
analysis, which was so important to the Empagran Court. To begin, the
perspective on interstate relations would invoke the rejected (but not really
rejected) sovereign model rather than the traditional one at work in the
Empagran decision. 349 Instead of interpreting § 6(a) as requiring a domestic
injury relation out of concern for the integrity of the Westphalian system, in
which various states attempting isolated maneuvers aimed at keeping hold of
their own sets of internal rules, the experimentalist would come to emphasize
the disaggregated, networked, technocratic world of "new governance." Anne-
Marie Slaughter offers one example of this view:
A new world order is emerging .... The state is not disappearing, it
is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These
parts-courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even
legislatures-are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating
a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental
order. 350
Rather than looking out at the world and finding individual sovereigns with
individualized sets of independent competition regimes, each with their own
rights to autonomy and their own sets of dependencies on their respective
domestic publics, this experimentalist sees global administration in the making
and remaking. 35 1 Transgovernmentalism, for example, is viewed as a chief
means of refurbishing domestic control through the horizontal disaggregation
348 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165-67 (2004).
149 See id. at 164.
35( Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN Ai-. 183, 184 (1997). Slaughter
suggests that transgovernmental networks operate in three ways. The first type emerges within international
institutions. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 347, 355 (2001). Probably the most well-known, these networks include groups of ministers and
regulators working with organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Id. at 356.
The second type of network is created through executive agreements that do not have the advantage of a
grounding in legislative treaty, and emerge outside the framework of international institutions. Id. at 357.
These networks often form out of informal presidential agreements that require attendant work and
cooperation. Id. at 358. The third type arises independently of formal intergovernmental agreements and
includes both networks that eventually institutionalize themselves as transgovernmental regulatory institutions
and those that comprise more informal agreements between the domestic regulators of two or more countries.
Id. at 359.
351 See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 350, at 184-86.
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of unitary states into state units that cooperate and coordinate with like-minded
units across borders. 352 The erosion of national power is not stemmed by
supranational efforts, but through transnational outreach and the enlargement
of liberal democratic arrangements. 353  As a consequence, the comity
discussion, with its rooting in the traditional model of internal/external rules,
loses its grip. After all, if the point of raising comity considerations is to
protect states from externalities, and an experimentalist dismisses the very
premise upon which externalities are based-that of the independent sovereign
model-then comity must mean something else.
Here, comity would mean something else: a judicial inclination towards
multi-jurisdictional information pooling.354 This inclination would be such
that comity-that nebulous principle geared toward the smooth operation of
the international system-would transform into a means for helping individual
nation-states communicate with one another on the changing shape of the
global administrative order. 35 5 In contrast to the Empagran Court, therefore,
the experimentalist judge would begin by looking to the FTAIA, find the
statutory language especially ambiguous, and set to work on unpacking the
phrase, "gives rise to a claim," against the backdrop of a presumption in favor
of a highly interconnected and interdependent world system. 356  The
incantation of "a plaintiff's claim will only be viable as long as the injury is
shown to be dependent on domestic anticompetitive harm" thus moves to its
reverse: "in order to avoid application of the FTAIA exception in favor of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the defendant must show that the plaintiff's injury
was independent of domestic harm." In the vitamins case, such a presumption
would be nearly impossible to rebut. Unless it could be shown that a but-for
formulation could excuse the defendant's role in the injury, the presumption
would work in favor of the plaintiff.
At the same time, however, this presumption in favor of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would be offset by another apple of the experimentalist eye: the
emphasis on local production and planning.3 5 7 While judging in the shadow of
a highly interdependent international order would be of certain importance, it
would also be true for the experimentalist that working out particular antitrust
352 Id. at 195.
353 Id. at 185 86.
354 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community qf Courts, 44 HARV. INT'l, L.J. 191, 206 (2003).
355 id.
356 See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 350, at 189.
357 Slaughter, supra note 354, at 206.
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and jurisdictional questions is a project best undertaken by specific localities,
and not some international architecture. 5 8 The reasoning here is that, as it is
impossible to simply construct an optimal system by way of rational
deduction-either on the score of global antitrust cartel issues or multi-
jurisdictional problems-the best practices of particular nations and sub-
national entities will have the highest likelihood of actually finding improvised
solutions. 359 With this set of considerations in hand, the experimentalist would
move on to the substantive question of who is actually doing what.
3. Deliberation and Infonnation Pooling
As suggested by the introduction of the locality caveat, the comity reversal
would not be the end of the line for the opinion. Although the orientation
towards a disaggregated society of interdependent states would push the court
toward a presumption in favor of jurisdiction, the brunt of the opinion would
focus less on the FFAIA and more on the goals of antitrust and competition
laws more generally. 360  This would carry the court directly into the "hard
look" territory of comparative examination that the Empagran Court found
rather intimidating. 361 This comparative work would not be done, however, in
the spirit of looking for the "best" or most efficient set of laws. Rather, the
purpose would be one of eliciting party responses on how various localities
attempt to regulate price-fixing violations of the type found in the vitamins
case. 362 To some extent, this is what happened with the foreign amicius briefs,
in which governments argued how their respective antitrust regimes were up to
the task. 6 3 While the experimental judge would have appreciated the amicus
briefs, the nature of the deliberation would have been lacking due to the
purpose of these interventions. Instead of showing how local programs relate
the means of market regulation to the end of distributional fairness or free
competition, the amici were instead focused on the destabilizing danger posed
by plaintiffs being able to forum shop with an eye towards U.S.-styled treble
358 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1068 (describing how experimentalists support stakeholder
negotiation a principle by which the interested parties that claim significant interests take part in the
negotiations).
359 Id. at 1094.
360 Slaughter, supra note 354, at 210.
361 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 69 (2004).
362 See id. at 167.
363 Id. See generally Brief of the U.K. and the Netherlands, supra note 203; Brief of Japan, supra note
203; Brief for Canada, supra note 203; Brief of Germany and Belgium, supra note 203 (discussing national
regulations structures).
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damages. 364  The experimentalist, after all, is not all that worried about
destabilization and the unsettling of expectations. Therefore, deliberation in
this case would instead be fashioned toward a survey of how different regions
have attempted various solutions to market regulation problems. This is
precisely a route rejected by the Empagran Court for its alleged
unworkability.
365
As should be clear, the experimental judge follows the force of the better
argument and not reified ideas like Westphalian sovereignty and "judicial
economy. ' 366 The type of deliberation expected by the experimental judge, as
a result, would demand arguments as to why the means sought in a particular
locality best capture that locality's ends. 367 This deliberation, moreover, would
extend not just to governments in their amicus briefs, but also to private
parties, as well as to other courts. 368 Ultimately, the purpose of the judge, after
having first established her inverted orientation of the international order and
the role of comity in contemporary international relations, is to seek a
deliberative environment in which the best information is considered.
369
4. Rolling-Rule Regimes
Once the judge's data had been sufficiently pooled, and to the degree that
many jurisdictions share common goals, the judge would then be in a better
position to arrange provisional plans for adjudication that would take into
account the diversity of interests. This account would also be on the lookout
364 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168.
35 Id. at 168-69. The Court wrote:
In our view, however, this approach is too complex to prove workable. The Sherman Act covers
many different kinds of anticompetitive agreements. Courts would have to examine how foreign
law, compared with American law, treats not only price fixing but also, say, information-sharing
agreements, patent-licensing price conditions, territorial product resale limitations, and various
forms of joint venture, in respect to both primary conduct and remedy. The legally and
economically technical nature of that enterprise means lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more
proceedings-to the point where procedural costs and delays could themselves threaten
interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the integrity of its own antitrust
enforcement system . . . How could a court seriously interested in resolving so empirical a
matter a matter potentially related to impact on foreign interests do so simply and
expeditiously?
Id.
366 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1093-94.
367 Id. at 1069-70.
368 See id.; Slaughter, supra note 354, at 209.
369 Slaughter, supra note 354, at 210.
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for the ways in which deliberation may have altered the threshold interests in
favor of consensus. Most importantly, however, would be the fact that the
judge would view any goals established by the parties in response to the
various antitrust provisions as provisional in nature. 37 Since there cannot be a
right answer in such a case, the very best that can be done is to consider, as
best we can, the actual state of the international order, recognize its demands,
take local participation as a key ingredient in the search for a better
extraterritoriality regime, talk about it, and come up with a rule that is self-
conscious of its temporality and open to revision as better information becomes
available. A likely consequence would be a dissent from the Empagran
majority in favor of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants on the strength of,
if nothing else, the destabilization effect that would probably ensue.
At a glance, one can see how the experimentalist judge would shuffle the
terms of jurisdictional discourse. Still relying on the same basic vocabulary,
comity would continue to play a large role, though in a way very different from
that in Empagran. The language of balancing and effects would be almost
wholly absent in terms of its traditional doctrinal usage, though it is easy
enough to imagine the concepts working their way-quite heavily-into the
deliberative phase of information-pooling. After all, what would such a
conversation look like if it was not concerned with how particular practices
affected particular communities, and how the judge might come to balance
such effects in his final proclamation? To be sure, the experimentalist decision
looks quite different from either its eclectic or economic siblings, but the basic
points of departure still seem beholden to the same linguistic paradigm of
internal and external sovereign rules.
CONCLUSION
This short conclusion will end with a few parting shots, directed mostly at
the eclectics. To begin, eclectic pragmatism is a conservative, incoherent, and
ultimately hypocritical style of legal reasoning. The purveyor of the eclectic
style, despite its consequentialist, action-oriented veneer, hopelessly fails to
make good on the promise of what is essentially at the bottom of philosophical
pragmatism: a promise that is meant, at its most basic level, to clear the
370 Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1096.
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juridical slate clean of what the well-known legal realist Felix Cohen called
"transcendental nonsense.
37 1
In Cohen's work, a juridical question like "where is a corporation?" was a
kind of this nonsense.372 As he explained, there are necessarily sociological
issues that attend such a question, such as when a corporation incorporated in
one state should be sued in another, or when the demands on a plaintiff to
bring his claim in the state of incorporation are greater than the costs of a
defendant corporation to defend actions in many states. 373 But "where is a
corporation?" asked by itself, with no attempt at sociological study, "is a
question identical in metaphysical status with the question which scholastic
theologians are supposed to have argued at great length, 'How many angels
can stand on the point of a needle?"'
374
In a similar way, one might criticize the notion of territorial/extraterritorial
jurisdiction at work in contemporary discourse. Think of the threshold
question in Empagran as an example: could the United States assert its
jurisdiction over foreign nationals injured by foreign parties on foreign soil? 375
In its descent into the reasonableness of its answer, the Court engaged in a bit
of Cohen's nonsense. It seems fairly obvious that the answer to the Empagran
question is an emphatic "yes." Can the United States assert its jurisdiction (its
authority to apply its variously prescriptive, adjudicative, and remedial powers)
over completely foreign phenomena? When jurisdiction is viewed in its
sociopolitical light, and not in its legal construction, one is hard-pressed to
understand how anyone could argue that American extraterritoriality is not
commonplace. For some scholars, in fact, globalization is just a synonym for
Americanization. 376 Americanization refers to, among other things, economic
trends that are specifically rooted in the United States; it refers to the direct
effects of the neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" economic policies on the
developing world; it refers to the propagation of property and contract rules by
development NGOs and American think tanks; it refers to comparative
constitutionalism that actively exports U.S.-styled ideas of federalism,
separation of powers, and judicial review; it refers to the imposition of
371 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoIUM. L. REV. 809, 812
(1935).
372 Id. at 810.
373 id.
374 id.
375 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
376 See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory o.flImperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance,
10 IND. J. GiLOBA LEGA STUID. 383, 408 (2003).
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governmental sanctions; it refers to war; it refers to MTV, McDonald's, and
Madonna.
"But surely," one might respond, "these are not instances of
'extraterritoriality' in the way the Empagran Court has in mind, and a mistake
has been made in confusing adjudication for legislation and the political for the
market. These are the facts of globalization and interdependence, and if
anything, just the sort of considerations the Court had in mind when it used
comity as a deciding factor against the plaintiffs. Also, these facts have
nothing to do with American courts and foreign people coming to use those
courts. In contrast, extraterritorial jurisdiction, as the term is understood by the
courts, involves the very different set of questions that asks when a state may
legally, reasonably, or justifiably assert its power over foreigners."
Obviously, there is a useful distinction between legal and sociological
events, and this imagined response is focused on it. Indeed, there is a legal
concept called extraterritorial jurisdiction that has a particular valence when
presented in the context of "plaintiffs" and "defendants" and "courts." At the
same time, one can easily examine the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction
from a sociopolitical perspective and quickly find that the United States asserts
its authority extraterritorially all over the place and all of the time, regardless
of the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law.377  As a consequence, the
conventional language of extraterritoriality tells a legal story about how and
when state authority is exercised, but only at the expense of another, much
bigger sociological story about the very same thing.
The question at issue in this Article, however, is not whether extraterritorial
jurisdiction is "transcendental nonsense." Rather, the issue is this: the question
of whether the legal story is better than the sociopolitical one is a question
meant to be asked by the pragmatist, and yet this is precisely the question the
eclectic forbids. It is political and, as a result, out of bounds. Furthermore, in
its eclectic guise the legal pragmatist constantly assists in the production of a
legal language of territorial jurisdiction that, intentionally or not, mystifies its
sociopolitical dimensions. This seems to be a flaw in the method of the
eclectic pragmatist, hiding the very real jurisdictional decisions that happen
beneath the radar of conventional discourse, and which are ultimately
necessary for a coherent consequentialism.
177 Id. at 408-10.
DLESAU I ELS -S I EINFINAL 3/16/2009 10:40:09 AM
2008] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & ANTITRUST 567
As for the economic and experimental pragmatist, these methods appear at
first glance to avoid this eclectic nonsense. These styles both appear to take
the political question head-on, speaking jurisdiction either in the normative
register of efficiency terms, or in the normative register of destabilization,
disaggregation, and deliberation. The pragmatic problem for each, however, is
the denial of the deconstructive power so terrifying to the eclectic.
The pragmatism of the economic pragmatist, it must be admitted, is hardly
pragmatism at all. On the surface, as evidenced in the writings of Richard
Posner, there is agreement with the eclectic that legal pragmatism should in no
.. 378
way be dependent on philosophical pragmatism. In fact, however, this
brand of legal pragmatism simply avoids one philosophy in exchange for
another: the normative base of welfare economics and utilitarianism. 379 While
welfare economics surely has its advantages, as well as a disciplinary diversity
that goes beyond the version as understood in the hands of someone like
Posner, it is just not pragmatism. As a consequence, the pragmatic power that
would open the judge up to the sociological facets of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and the artificial limits of jurisdictional discourse, is unavailable
to the economic pragmatist.
As for the experimentalist view, at least in the idiosyncratic way that it has
been portrayed in this Article, it seems to fail the "nonsense test" in much the
same way as the eclectic. It has been argued that one of the major factors
distinguishing the experimentalist from the eclectic has been a rejection of
Richard Rorty's philosophy-politics distinction. 380 This is certainly correct in
the sense that eclectics find it difficult to navigate the legal terrain when it
becomes too heavily associated with political questions. For the eclectic, the
deconstructive power immanent in pragmatic philosophy just runs out when
the jurist is faced with legal decisions. The experimentalist, in contrast, evades
this worry by arguing for a transformed public sphere where the inertia of
rational deliberation will inevitably produce subversive effects on the status-
quo. 38' The apparent upshot is the appearance of an experimentalist highly
cognizant of political consequences in a way that the eclectic is not.
This portrayal is probably correct, but also a little misleading. While the
experimental style is undeniably truer to pragmatist philosophy and the
378 POSNER, supra note 35, at 11.
379 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 595-610.
38( Grey, Freestanding, supra note 59, at 27.
381 Sabel & Simon, supra note 46, at 1068.
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subversive themes of legal realism, the nature of the experimental method may
be susceptible to political blind-spots. For example, imagine an
experimentalist sitting on the Empagran Court, interested as she is in fostering
the discursive possibilities among a wide spectrum of public and private actors
on the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This judge does not know where
this method is going, and will probably not be focused on the distributional
consequences of the subsequent provisional jurisdictional arrangement.382  Of
course, the experimental judge will look quite closely at the various arguments
on who is expected to benefit and who is expected to lose. But the key point
here is that the actual winners and losers-the knowledge of how the structure
of jurisdictional discourse hurts some parties and favors others-cannot be a
primary factor in the judge's decisional matrix. If it were, the experimental
judge would leave behind her emphasis on innovation and subversion in favor
of a particular norm, such as a predisposition toward anti-subordination.
383
This kind of formula does not describe the work of the experimental
382 Fernanda Nicola has made this criticism in the context of European Union law, in which
"proceduralists" (who are similar in vein to what I am calling experimentalists) are out to lunch in their
political blind-spots. See Fernanda G. Nicola, Another View oi European Integration: Distributive Stakes in
the Harmonization qf European Law, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GIFOBAIIZATION AND MARKETS:
RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AN) STRATEGY 256 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007) ("[I]n aiming to reconcile and normalize
colliding interests through the further elaboration of legal justifications before deliberative fora, these jurists
leave in the background the political stakes and the distributive consequences of multi-level governance
alliances.").
383 There was a fashion of imagining pragmatism in just this way in the 1990s by scholars affiliated with
critical race theory and feminism. See, e.g., Richard Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood,
48 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1995): Marl J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763 (1990); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. Rev.
1597. 1633 (1990): Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
The project has been heavily criticized by pragmatist philosophers like Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish. See
Richard Rorty, The Proessor and the Prophet, 52 TRANSITION 70, 75 (1992) (reviewing CORNEL WEST, THE
AMERICAN EVASION OF PHIL)SOPHY: A GENEAL(OGY OF PRAGMATISM): STANLEY E. FISH, THE TRoUHI E WITH
PRINCIPLE 305 (1999). On the proposed relationship between the pragmatic method and critical theory, Rorty
disapprovingly writes: "Pragmatism is ... like a corridor off which innumerable rooms open [which provides
space for] getting rid of some Platonic and Cartesian rubbish... [;] it is neutral between alternative prophecies,
and thus neutral between democrats and fascists." Rorty, supra, at 75. Similarly, Fish counsels against
coupling pragmatism with a normative principle:
Turning into just another would-be foundation-into another theory that would then have
consequences-is always the danger pragmatism courts when it becomes too
ambitious .... [W]hatever form it takes, the [ambitious] project is an instance of what I call the
critical self-consciousness fallacy or antifoundationalist theory hope, the fallacy of thinking that
there is a mental space you can occupy to the side of your convictions and conmmitments, and the
hope that you can use the lesson that no transcendent standpoint is available as a way of
bootstrapping yourself to transcendence ....
FISH, supra, at 305.
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pragmatist; rather, it veers closer to the territory of the left-leaning economist
who is willing to take a political stand on the distributional consequences of
highlighting one set of jurisdictional rules over another. To be sure, the
experimental judge may be familiar with the fact of these distributional
consequences, but when it comes to the point of decision, those facts are not
ultimately determinative. Instead, as we have seen, the decision is guided first
by an interest in subversive dialogue among as many available participants as
possible, hinging the possibilities of a better world on the promise of rational
talk, and little else.384
Why, then, does the experimentalist suffer from transcendental nonsense?
Despite the political muscle the experimental judge brings to bear on the point
of decision, she nevertheless leaves vacant the question of who should win and
who should lose. Leaving this question in abeyance is all the stranger for the
experimentalist, since part of her method brings into question exactly these
distributional issues. But instead of bringing some norm to bear on how a
decision should undermine the power structure, the experimentalist is forced,
after having brought the distributional question into focus, to push it into the
background once again. If she does not, and takes the question head-on with a
normative point of departure other than simply vying for more deliberation and
more innovation, she ceases to be an experimental pragmatist. The conundrum
for this position, as a consequence, is to disenchant transcendental questions
like "does the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign
parties?" only to re-enchant them by blinding itself to the consequences of that
very work.
The ostensible triumph of legal pragmatism is unfortunate. As has been
seen in this review of extraterritorial antitrust jurisprudence, the eclectic style
perpetually backgrounds its political dimensions by seeking decision-making
procedures that appear "reasonable," "moderate," and "balanced." The
eclectic's enchantment of reason, however, often turns out to be "little more
than a pleasant name for faith, dogma, prejudice, and company. This rather
sinister development comes from precisely the partisans of reason-those who
384 There is a resemblance here between the somewhat "post-political" move of the experimentalist to
background distributional consequences and those economists who privilege Kaldor-Hicks over the Pareto
Principle. In both cases, there is a particular norm that is privileged over the facts of who is actually winning
and who is losing. For the experimentalist, it is innovative deliberation and for the economist, it is efficiency.
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claim to be its champions. ' 385 The economic style, in contrast, either suffers
the same fate or simply ceases to be pragmatist at all. As for experimental
pragmatism, hopes remain high for a no-nonsense approach to the
distributional consequences of the doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It's
hard to see much daylight here, however, as long as experimentalists are
wedded to the notion of a "post-political" technocracy. Whether we look
ahead with anticipation to Roberto Unger's new pragmatism,386 or reach back
nostalgically to the potent pragmatism of the early twentieth century, the legal
pragmatism of today seems determined to disappoint.
385 PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 144-45 (1998).
386 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 35, at 614-17 (discussing Unger's The SelfAwakened).
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